9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act

9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT -- (House of Representatives - October 08, 2004)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, H.R. 10.

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AMENDMENT NO. 5 OFFERED BY MR. SESSIONS

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.

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Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Today, I rise to offer my legislation, Prevention of Terrorist Access to Destructive Weapons Act, an amendment to H.R. 10. This amendment will aid the hard-working Federal investigators and agents on the front line in the war on terror by establishing a zero tolerance policy towards the illegal importation, possession or transfer of shoulder-fired missiles, atomic weapons, dirty bombs, and the smallpox virus.

Mr. SESSIONS. Today, maximum penalties of only 10 years in prison apply to the unlawful possession of shoulder-fired missiles. The same weak penalty also currently applies to the unlawful possession of an atomic weapon. Today, there is no law criminalizing the possession of dirty bombs with criminal intent, and the unregistered possession of the smallpox virus carries a maximum penalties of only 5 years in prison.

Given the terrorist threats that we currently face in the United States, weak punishments for the possession or use of these weapons is simply unacceptable in light of the fact that we know that 26 terror groups already have shoulder-fired missiles in their possession.

My amendment imposes stringent, mandatory minimum criminal penalties for these heinous crimes similar to the laws that we already use to prosecute drug kingpins. Specifically, for each of the weapons covered by the bill, unlawful possession would result in mandatory imprisonment for up to 30 years to life. Using, attempting, or conspiring to use, or possessing and threatening to use these weapons would result in mandatory life in prison. And if one death were to result from the unlawful possession of one of these weapons, this amendment would allow the death penalty to be applied to anyone who targets America in a terrorist attack.

Although tougher penalties may not deter homicidal terrorists determined to attack the United States, they will help to deter those middlemen who are essential to the transfer of such weapons. Many of these middlemen aid terrorists purely for financial gain, and significantly tougher mandatory penalties would dramatically alter their cost-benefit calculations.

When the middleman is caught importing or hiding these weapons, the existence of tough penalties will also assist prosecutors and investigators in obtaining cooperation and moving swiftly to identify terrorists. Long mandatory sentences, including life without parole, provide a fast and powerful incentive to cooperate, as has already been proven in cracking the code of silence for organized crime. In the case of these dangerous weapons, the speed with which persons choose to cooperate could also save thousands of lives.

These increased penalties are completely justified in light of the catastrophic destruction that could be caused by the use of any of these weapons, and supporting my amendment will send a strong message of America's resolve to win the war on terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting and giving Federal investigators and prosecutors the tools they have asked for to aid them in their fight against terrorism by supporting this commonsense, effective amendment.

[From the Associated Press, Aug. 5, 2004]
Two Arrested in Missile Sting Operation

WASHINGTON.-Two leaders of a mosque in Albany, New York, were arrested on charges stemming from an alleged plot to help a man they thought was a terrorist who wanted to purchase a shoulder-fired missile, federal authorities said Thursday.

The men have ties to a group called Ansar al-Islam, which has been linked to the al Qaeda terror network, according to two federal law enforcement authorities speaking on condition of anonymity.

The two arrests came as FBI, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and other agents executed search warrants at the Masjid As-Salam mosque and two Albany-area homes, officials said. The men were identified as Yassin Aref, 34, the imam of the mosque, and 49-year-old Mohammed Hoosain, one of the mosque's founders.

According to law enforcement officials, the two are being charged with providing material support to terrorism by participating in a conspiracy to help an individual they believed was a terrorist purchase a shoulder-fired missile.

The individual was an undercover government agent and no missile ever changed hands. Aref and Hoosain were allegedly involved in money-laundering aspects of the plot, the officials said.

The investigation has been going on for a year and is not related to the Bush administration's decision earlier this week to raise the terror alert level for certain financial sector buildings in New York and Washington, the officials said.

In Albany, some mosque members gathered early Thursday outside the institution for morning prayers.

More details about the case were expected to be released later Thursday by the Justice Department.
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[From the Los Angeles Times, Mar. 4, 2004]
2 Convicted of Seeking Missiles for Al Qaeda Ally
(By Tony Perry)

SAN DIEGO.-A Pakistani national and a naturalized American pleaded guilty Wednesday to a conspiracy to help the Al Qaeda terrorist group by selling five tons of hashish and a half-ton of heroin in exchange for money and four Stinger missiles.

Muhamed Abid Afridi, 30, and a naturalized citizen from Inida, Ilyas Ali, 56, admitted in U.S. District Court here that they planned to sell the missiles to the Taliban, an ally of Al Qaeda.

Afridi, Ali and a second Pakinstani were arrested in Hong Kong in September 2002 after meeting with undercover FBI agents posing as arms dealers with Stingers to sell. They allegedly offered to sell the agents heroin and hashish in return for missiles and money.

"They both had the will and the means to carry out the transaction they were negotiating," said Assistant U.S. Atty. Michael Skerlos.

Stingers are shoulder-launched missiles distributed widely by the CIA to Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet army in the 1980s. Easy to use and deadly accurate at hitting low-flying aircraft, Stingers were credited with helping the Afghans demoralize and rout the much stronger Soviets.

"Because of the actions taken in this investigation, America is safer and our citizens are more secure," Atty. General John Ashcroft said in a statement.

Initial meetings between Ali and the FBI agents occurred in San Diego, according to court documents. Afridi and Ali are scheduled to be sentenced June 29 by Judge M. James Lorenz; a plea bargain recommends that each be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison.

The case against the second Pakistani, Syed Mustajab Shah, has a court date April 5.

Ali was a grocer in Minneapolis before his arrest.
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[From Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 2001]
The Proliferation of MANPADS
(By Thomas B. Hunter)

Man-portable surface-to-air missiles, also known as MANPADs, represent a significant potential threat to military and civilian aircraft.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of SA-series MANPADs has increased, and the diffusion of these weapons now exceeds the infamous spread of US-made Stinger missiles from Afghanistan during the 1990s. Today, MANPADs of various types are in the hands of as many as 27 guerrilla and terrorist groups around the world.

Tracking the proliferation of MANPADs is a difficult endeavour. Often, the only verification of use by non-state actors has been post-event in nature-recovery of a used launcher or fragments from expended missiles. The black market is the primary source for these weapons. Unlike state-to-state transfers, usually documented and visible, the illicit black market MANPAD trade defies accurate tracking.

The inability of governments to correctly identify seized weapons also contributes to inaccurate reports. In many cases, soldiers and government officials have identified rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and other handheld rocket launchers as MANPADs. Moreover, the word 'Stinger' has become an all-encompassing term for any MANPAD among many civilian, military, and non-state groups, further complicating efforts to verify proliferation activity.

In many cases of surface-to-air attacks on aircraft, misreporting is quite common. Airbursts occurring near low-flying aircraft have frequently been reported as attacks by MANPADs, when in fact they are usually RPGs. Attacks on aircraft at very low altitudes, those occurring under 1,000 feet, are almost exclusively RPGs. Guerrilla and terrorist forces have successfully adapted the RPG to the anti-aircraft role. This skill was demonstrated perhaps most clearly when two US MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by Somali gunmen in October 1993.

One popular misconception is that these missiles become unusable after several years due to battery or other systems failures, and are therefore useless after a period of time. While it is true that all MANPAD batteries have a finite shelf life, these can be replaced with commercially purchased batteries available on the open market and technically proficient terrorist groups might also be able to construct hybrid batteries to replace used ones.

Other concerns include deterioration of missile propellants and seeker coolant, and general storage issues. While these concerns merit attention, the commonly held assumption that these weapons have short shelf lives is erroneous. Most missiles are hermetically sealed in launchers designed for rough handling by soldiers in the field. Temperature extremes are also factored into the design of these weapons, reducing the threat of environmental degradation.

Clearly, the shelf life of MANPADs is, in large part, dependent on the conditions in which the weapon is stored. However, under ideal (factory specified) conditions, some versions of these weapons can remain operational for 22 years or more. So while it can be assumed that some weapons have not been stored in ideal conditions, many weapons previously believed to be inoperative, such as the Afghan Stingers, may indeed be operational.

Furthermore, MANPADs remain a popular commodity on the global black arms market. With the exception of the Soviet-Afghan war, these weapons are more widespread today than at any time since their introduction in the late 1960s. Guerrilla and terrorist organisations can obtain them with relative ease, with the primary limitation being money. As some of these groups increase their profits through drug trafficking and other activities, the likelihood of further illicit purchases will also increase.

MANPADs have proliferated to non-state groups throughout sub-Saharan Africa. These weapons can be found in the hands of insurgent groups in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia. Rwanda and Somalia.

Of these states, Angola has seen the greatest activity. The CIA covertly provided FIM-92A Stinger missiles to UNITA rebels in the late 1980s as part of its effort to assist in the overthrow of Angola's pro-communist government. As in Afghanistan, efforts to recover the missiles following the end of hostilities proved futile. Today UNITA retains an unknown number of advanced weapons, which may be augmented with SA-7 (NATO reporting name 'Grail,' Russian name Strela-2) and FIM-43 Redeye missiles captured from government forces.

UNITA has also shown willingness to use them, sometimes against civilian aircraft. UNITA fired missiles at three World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft in June 2001, for example. One plane was struck but managed to land safely at a nearby airport. This attack was of particular concern in that the missile struck the aircraft at an altitude of 15,000 feet--3,500 feet beyond the weapon's published maximum range. While this is not the first report of Stinger missiles reaching this height, it is clear that aircraft travelling at an altitude believed to be out of the range of these weapons should be aware of this proven capability.

During the Soviet-Afghan War, the CIA working in conjunction with the Pakistani Army's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), delivered over 1,000 Stingers to Mujahideen rebels. While the rebels fired many of the missiles against Soviet aircraft, hundreds remained after the fighting ended in 1987. Poor bookkeeping at the CIA, combined with the dispersal of the weapons to numerous clans throughout the country, made accounting for and recovering them impossible. The result was a proliferation of advanced anti-aircraft weaponry throughout the region.

It is well-known that the rebels did not retain all of the Stingers left behind after the war. Many found their way onto the global grey and black arms markets and ended up in guerrilla arsenals from Sri Lanka to Chechnya. With a reported black market price of between US$80,000 and $250,000, Stingers represent a significant profit potential due in no small part to widespread demand.

Terrorist leader Osama bin Laden also reportedly possesses a number of MANPADs, including SA-7s and Stingers. As Bin Laden has both the financial resources and black market connections to make procurement possible, these reports are probably accurate. Persistent rumours also indicate that Bin Laden's personal bodyguards may be equipped with Stingers, ostensibly to counter an airborne attack.

Regardless of the veracity of the latter information, it is logical to assume that Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda ('The Base') network is in possession of additional MANPADs. If this is true, then Al-Qaeda represents the most significant threat to international civil aviation. Given Bin Laden's specific threats against U.S. citizens, this threat is especially relevant with regard to U.S.-owned airlines.

While the Russian military is certainly not confronted with the same threat level that it experienced in Afghanistan, the increased proliferation of MANPADs to Chechen rebels has dramatically increased the danger to close air support (CAS) aircraft operating in theatre. A number of aircraft have been shot down, including Su-25 'Frogfoot' and Su-24 'Pencer' fighter-bombers. MANPADs have also shot down a number of military helicopters.

The sources of Chechen MANPADs are varied. However, a large number of systems have been seized by Russian authorities, indicating that the rebels have established an effective pipeline for delivery. For example, three SA-7 missiles were found in the territory of Ingushetia near the Russian-Georgian border in September 2000. Just one month later, an unspecified number of SA-7s were discovered in a building near Severy airport. The following month a Russian military operation resulted in the seizure of four SA-7 missiles with their launchers from a lorry in Dagestan. A rebel spokesman later announced that the weapons were part of a shipment of arms destined for use in Chechnya. The shipment reportedly cost the Chechens $40,000.

Another report indicated that Bin Laden might have delivered as many as 50 Stinger missiles to the Chechens. The weapons were to have been transported from either Georgia or Azerbaijan and delivered in December 1999. Eight Stinger missiles were reportedly airdropped in the mountains of Sharoyskiy District on the night of 12-13 June 2001. The source of these weapons was not reported.

The primary MANPAD threat in the Western Hemisphere is their possible future use by the two main Colombian insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional-ELN). Complicating analysis of the Colombia MANPAD situation is a plethora of false of misleading reporting.

Colombian electronic and print press outlets have regularly reported that both the FARC and ELN possess these missile systems. Government officials have also fanned this fire by issuing corroborating statements. These reports, both military and civilian, cumulatively suggest that the FARC currently possesses SA-7, SA-14 "Gremlin", SA-16 "Gimlet" and Redeye missiles. The Redeye missiles were variously reported to have come from Nicaraguan (former Contra) or Syrian arsenals and the SA-series weapons from various sources. There is no definitive evidence, however, to confirm that any Colombian guerrilla group currently possesses MANPADs of any type.

This misreporting is usually a matter of an honest mistake due to lack of familiarity with MANPADs, the Colombian situation may mask an ulterior motive. While the threat to the Colombian government from insurgent and narcotics trafficking groups is quite real, it is well-known that officials from that government have frequently overstated the sophistication of rebel groups in an effort to garner greater financial and political support from the USA. Given this history, it is possible that MANPAD events have occasionally been intentionally overstated.

According to Colombia expert Steven Salisbury, FARC commanders have admitted to possessing MANPADs. "The FARC commanders who told me the FARC has shoulder-fired SAMs [surface-to-air missiles] were field commanders talking privately to me," he said. "They said, yes, they have SAMs." This information given to Salisbury was corroborated by two FARC block commanders as well as other guerrillas.

Four additional factors must be highlighted. The first of these is that FARC commanders have stated that they do indeed possess MANPADs. The second is that both the FARC and ELN are known to be aggressively seeking these weapons. The third factor is that the guerrillas have received training on these weapons. In one instance, a Colombian government source stated that 25 guerrillas travelled to Nicaragua to attend an anti-aircraft course taught by former Sandanista soldiers. This course reportedly included MANPAD training as well as gunnery techniques involving 0.50-calibre heavy machine guns and the use of RPG-7s in the anti-air role. FARC members may also have travelled to Syria and Libya to receive similar training. Finally, both the FARC and ELN have the financial resources to make such a purchase possible.

With these factors in mind, it appears likely that the FARC will procure at least one type of MANPAD-if it has not done so already. Colombian guerrilla groups have had very little difficulty obtaining weapons for use in their war against the government. Well-established arms transit routes are in place to facilitate these shipments. The arms pipelines through which the FARC and ELN may obtain MANPADs run through the following countries Albania, Belgium, Ecuador, Jordan, North Korea, Peru, Romania, and Russia. Of specific concern is the Russian relationship, as the FARC and Russian mafias have a well-established arms-for-drugs pipeline in place. The Russian mafias have demonstrated the ability to obtain virtually any type of weapons system. If the Colombian guerrillas are to obtain these weapons, and have not been successful already, they will most likely come from this black market channel.

It must be noted that when the FARC obtains these weapons, it will almost certainly use them only in critical situations, such as the defence of important base camps or headquarters facilities. They will most likely not be used against drug-spraying aircraft or other non-threatening targets due to the high value of MANPADs to the FARC leadership.

If the FARC does indeed maintain a small inventory of these weapons, this is the most likely explanation for why they have not yet been employed. If employed, targets would most likely include Colombian Air Force CAS aircraft or possibly high-value civilian flights such as aircraft transporting senior government officials.

Hizbullah probably took its first delivery of MANPADs in 1982 with the acquisition of a small number of SA-7s. Reporting since that time indicates that these stocks were supplemented with PIM-92A Stingers in the mid-1990s, provided by Islamic Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan. Most recently, the group may have received a small number of Chinese-made Qianwei ('Advanced Guard')--1 (QW-1) systems. If true, the acquisition of this latter system represents a significant upgrade in the surface-to-air capabilities of Hizbullah.

The Palestinian Authority also maintains a stock of SA-7 missiles and launchers. Reports also indicates that the Palestinians may have a small number of Stinger systems as well. The source of the SA-7 weapons is unclear, but it is possible some were delivered from Egypt aboard fishing boats, a common local method of arms smuggling.

For example, on 8 May 2001, Israeli security services intercepted the Lebanese-flagged vessel Santorini off the coast between Haifa and Tel Aviv. A search of the ship revealed a large quantity of arms, including 60 mm mortars, landmines, grenades, and four SA-7 missiles with launchers. The shipment was reportedly sent by the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and intended for use by Palestinian militants. The MANPADS were confiscated by the Israelis and probably added to their own arsenal.

Apart from the Afghan Mujahideen, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have enjoyed the greatest success with MANPADs. LTTE guerrillas have fired an estimated 20 missiles at government aircraft since 1996, shooting down three helicopters and probably two fixed-wing transports. These attacks killed a total of 179 personnel.

It is estimated that the LTTE possesses SA-7, SA-1a, and other MANPADs. One Chinese-built Hongying-5 (HN-5A) system was also discovered during government operations; however, there is no indication that the LTTE possesses additional units. It is possible that this weapon was procured from sources within the Burmese military.

In December 2000 Sri Lankan news carried video of a Tamil rebel holding what appeared to be a Stinger missile during an October operation against the Trincomalee naval facility. However, later analysis indicated this weapon was most probably a double barrelled 107 mm Katyusha rocket, believed to be a variant of the Chinese Type 63 107mm launcher, and not a MANPAD.

The LTTE reportedly acquired these weapons from a variety of sources. Press reports indicated that the Kurdistan's Worker's Party (PPK), working with the Greek 17 November terrorist organisation, sold 11 Stinger missiles to the LTTE in 1994. These weapons were reportedly built in Greece, which is a member of European consortium manufacturing PIM-92A/C Stinger systems under license from the USA. Other Stingers may have been sold or donated to the Tamils by the Afghan Taliban during the 1990s. LTTE weapons buyers have also been reported in Cambodia and Thailand, reportedly seeking MANPADs Given the Tamils success with these weapons, it is likely that procurement efforts will continue.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

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Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the several very important articles in my added materials that I have submitted speak not only to the threat to the United States, but also the reality of the groups who were engaged in the transfer, the trafficking of shoulder-fired missiles, of weapons of mass destruction, in terms of viruses that could be placed in the United States of America.

Mr. Chairman, I respect the gentleman for not liking the minimum mandatory sentences. I would also say that it is up to this body, Mr. Chairman, to make sure that we provide the tools necessary to the Attorney General and other U.S. attorneys who may be prosecuting these cases, to give to the frontline agents and investigators those abilities to find and stop those people who are perpetrators of crime, mass murder against the United States of America.

Most of all, I would remind this body how important it is to make sure that we keep terrorism away from our doorsteps. I believe in effective law enforcement, effective use of the laws of this country, and making sure that we have looked at this from the perspective of the Attorney General of the United States and U.S. attorneys across this country who support this important legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I would just point out that we already have in the Code serious penalties for all of these crimes. The appropriate way to legislate would be to go through the committee so that we could see exactly how these fit into the present sentencing scheme. I would hope that we defeat the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Members of this body understand that there is a need to make sure that we protect this country and the laws of this country. We have consulted with the Attorney General of the United States and other U.S. attorneys who are asking for this. I support this amendment. I believe it will help the President of the United States to ensure the safety of our country.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).

The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

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