Executive Session
Floor Speech
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Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the importance of Minutemen III intercontinental ballistic missiles, known as ICBMs, and an amendment I intend to offer. The ICBM is just one leg of our nuclear triad. The nuclear triad spans sea, air, and land. It relies on mobile bombers, hard-to-detect ballistic missile submarines, and ICBMs. They all work together to complicate and deter any attempt at a successful first strike on our country. Like a stool, if you shorten just one leg too much, the stool will become unstable.
Our nuclear triad is not just a weapons system, it is a deterrent. The further we weaken our nuclear forces, the less of a deterrent our triad will become.
Those folks who believe in nuclear zero and arms control seek a world without nuclear weapons at any expense--in my opinion, never at the expense of our national security. The fact is, for over 50 years our ICBM force has deterred a nuclear attack against the United States and our allies.
Some arms control supporters claim our ICBMs are on ``hair-trigger alert.'' They believe an ICBM can be launched by simply pushing a button. This misleading claim that an unauthorized launch can destroy the world in a matter of minutes could not be further from the truth.
GEN Kevin Chilton, the outgoing commander of STRATCOM, once described our nuclear posture as:
The weapon is in the holster ..... the holster has two combination locks on it, it takes two people to open those locks, and they can't do it without authenticated orders from the President of the United States.
The Minuteman III ICBM force is the most stabilizing leg of the nuclear triad.
ICBMs are strategically located and broadly dispersed in order to prevent them from successfully being attacked. The ICBMs protect the survivability of other legs of the triad as a deterrent. They offer an umbrella of protection to our most-valued allies. ICBMs also represent the most cost-effective delivery systems the United States processes. Unlike a bomber, ICBMs ensure a second attack capability.
As required by section 1251 of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, earlier this year, the administration submitted its force structure plan. The President's 1251 force structure plan provides up to 420 ICBMs, 14 submarines carrying up to 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs, and up to 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
We are being asked to ratify this treaty without knowing what our force structure will actually be. We are being told: Pass the treaty, and then we will tell you what the force structure will actually look like.
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review laid out our force structure in plain view, while the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review is silent on the force structure.
This report also laid out the administration's plan to modernize and maintain our nuclear delivery vehicles.
With respect to the next generation of ICBMs, the update states:
While a decision on an ICBM follow-on is not needed for several years, preparatory analysis is needed and is in fact now underway. This work will consider a range of deployment options, with the objective of defining a cost-effective approach for an ICBM follow-on that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while promoting stable deterrence.
The amendment I plan to offer has no impact on the treaty. It simply requires the President to certify that further reductions in our land-based strategic nuclear deterrent will not be considered when reviewing the options for a follow-on ICBM. This is something I have worked on with Senator Conrad. He has a second-degree amendment to mine, and it is something we both support.
LTG Frank Klotz, the new commander of Global Strike Command, was quoted last year at the Air Force Air and Space Conference and Technology Exposition here in Washington, DC, as saying:
Continuously on alert and deployed in 450 widely dispersed locations, the size and characteristics of the overall Minuteman III force presents any potential adversary with an almost insurmountable challenge should he contemplate attacking the United States. Because he cannot disarm the ICBM force without nearly exhausting his own forces in the process, and at the same time, leaving himself vulnerable to our sea-launched ballistic missiles and bombers, he has no incentive to strike in the first place. In this case, numbers do matter ..... and the ICBM thus contributes immeasurably to both deterrence and stability in a crisis.
The force structure of our nuclear triad is critical to maintaining an effective deterrent.
In 2008, Secretary Gates coauthored a white paper titled ``National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.'' This paper argued for a strong nuclear deterrent. The forward stated:
We believe the logic presented here provides a sound basis on which this and future administrations can consider further adjustments to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure.
The white paper by Secretary Gates recommended a U.S. strategic nuclear force baseline that includes 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, 14 Ohio class submarines, and 76 bombers, 20 B-2 and 26 B-52 bombers, for a total of 862. The administration cannot explain how the threat environment has changed since the 2008 recommendation to maintain 862 delivery vehicles. They cannot explain what has changed to allow our nuclear deterrent to be reduced to 700 delivery vehicles.
It sounds to me as if this administration has been a little too eager in negotiating the treaty.
James Woolsey, in a recent Wall Street Journal article, described his experiences negotiating with the Russians. He said:
The Soviets taught me that, when dealing with Russian counterparts, don't appear eager--friendly, yes, eager, never.
I think Mr. Woolsey would know; he was involved in the SALT I treaty in 1970 and many more arms control agreements with the Russians before he took over as the Director of Central Intelligence.
I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 4880, a Barrasso-Enzi amendment, and then a second-degree by Senator Conrad.
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