Iraq Intelligence

IRAQ INTELLIGENCE

Mr. REED. Mr. President, Seamus Heaney, the Irish poet and Nobel laureate, wrote lines that are destined for immortality:

History says, Don't hope on this side of the grave. But then, once in a lifetime the longed for tidal wave of justice can rise up, and hope and history rhyme.

We all long for that day when hope and history rhyme. But it is the special province of statecraft to try to make that rhyme.

As such, one way to look at foreign policy is to determine if our policies do rhyme with history or whether they represent the triumph of hope over history. By history, I do not mean the strictly academic variety. I mean the accumulation of insight and experience that we all carry about. Perhaps it is better described as our rough sense of the way the world works.

It is particularly interesting to pose these questions in light of the Bush foreign policy since so much of it seems to spring from ideological hope, from robust attempts to reshape the world along predetermined lines.

Iraq, of course, is the crucial arena. It has been made so by the administration.

Our immediate response to September 11 was to seek out and destroy the terrorist apparatus that struck us. Our attack in Afghanistan was aimed at the heart of al-Qaida and the rogue regime that provided it sanctuary. We understood very painfully that we could not grant these terrorists safe harbor. We had to act and we had to be prepared to act preemptively to destroy al-Qaida. The threat was clear and in the context of international terrorists like al-Qaida, the doctrine of preemption was not only compelling but also inescapable.

Operation Enduring Freedom, the demolition of the Taliban regime, and the disruption of the al-Qaida infrastructure represented a shrewd use of military power to focus directly on an existential threat. The history, again, using my very nontechnical definition, clearly shows that al-Qaida could not be deterred and toleration would simply invite further attack.

Ironically, having begun the destruction of al-Qaida in Afghanistan, the administration quickly shifted its attention from the complete destruction of the al-Qaida network to Iraq. Only in the past few weeks has the Bush administration begun to realize that Afghanistan is far from secure. They are redoubling their military and political efforts to ensure that Afghanistan does not slide back into a failed state. Still, the President's recent budget request only provides about $1 billion in funding for that effort, whereas commanders in the field have said they will annually need $5 billion to ensure success.

Furthermore, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan, and indeed anywhere else, the Bush administration has never lost its preoccupation with Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime.

Some may recall that in January of 1998, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Wolfowitz, and other prominent neoconservatives wrote to President Clinton urging him to use military force to remove Saddam Hussein. In their words:

The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq would be able to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.

This letter predated the attack on Iraq by 5 years. It predated September 11 by more than 3 years.

With the publication of the first glimpses inside the Bush administration, this preoccupation with Iraq becomes more obvious. Former Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill recounts that at the first meeting of the National Security Council on January 30, 2001, the discussion quickly vaulted over nagging issues of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and landed squarely on Iraq. In an apparently scripted exchange, Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Cheney and George Tenet not only led the discussion but also concluded with an examination of grainy photos purporting to show what the CIA thought was a plant producing chemical or biological materials for weapons manufacture. According to O'Neill, "ten days in, and it was about Iraq."

September 11 did not put Iraq in the administration's gunsights. It was always there. It was there as a challenge, a personal one for the President, and in the view of neoconservatives, it was there as an opportunity to make hope and history rhyme.

But in focusing almost exclusively on Iraq, the administration, in my view, disregarded a great deal of history. Again, I use the term history colloquially. The justification for action was based more on assumptions than evidence. The planning for their actions was based more on hopes than experience. The end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union unshackled our military power so that we are unbeatable in any conventional battle against any conventional foe.

However, it has not reversed a century in which empires collapsed and foreign colonies began a troubled but independent road. Our military power may be unchecked by any military adversary, but it is exercised in a world that has come to distrust the unilateral use of force and disbelief of the motives of those who wield such force.

The administration's insistence on an essentially unilateral approach to confronting Iraq not only increased our effort both militarily and economically, but it also defied the worldwide consensus that without an immediate threat, the unilateral action of a great power against a lesser state is a vanished aspect of the colonial epic.

Today, the United States is fervently trying to maintain the mantle of liberator and avoid the label of occupier. In large part, this is due to the overwhelming presence of the United States unleavened by a broad array of allies or the significant presence of the United States or United Nations or NATO in Iraq.

In contrast, multinational operations in places such as the Balkans managed to avoid the stigma of occupation and insurgency for almost a decade. A multilateral attack is not a talisman that will guarantee success, but it is more congruent with a world that has rejected the colonial solution in favor of multinational action.

The administration's rationale for a preemptive and virtually unilateral operation against Iraq rested on a faithful devotion to their preconceived notions and a strained reading of available intelligence. One of the more thoughtful and evenhanded military analysts, Anthony Cordesman, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies has accurately summarized the record of the administration's intelligence activities leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In his words:

[T]here are many indications that the U.S. intelligence community came under pressure to accept reporting by Iraqi opposition forces with limited credibility, and in some cases, a history of actively lying to either exaggerate their own importance or push the U.S. towards a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. In what bore a striking resemblance to similar worst case interpretations of the global threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles under the Rumsfeld Commission, U.S. policymakers not only seem to have pushed for the interpretation that would best justify military action, but to have focused on this case as if it were a reality, rather than a possibility.

In the U.S., this pressure seems to have come primarily from the Office of the Vice President and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but it seems clear that the Bush administration as a whole sought intelligence that would support its case in going to war, and this had a significant impact on the intelligence community from 2002-onwards.

The administration did not use intelligence to help make a difficult decision. It used intelligence to sell a preconceived notion. The long-term fixed view of the administration held that deterrence and international inspectors were inherently incapable of containing Saddam. Only the elimination of the regime could suffice. Moreover, regime change, in their view, could have the added benefit of precipitating a transformation of the entire region.

In effect, what the President and the administration did is present a false dichotomy to the American people-two choices, when there are many more. The two choices were: Attack Iraq or do nothing. In fact, there are many other things we could have done and perhaps should have done, including give the U.N. inspectors more time to search. They might have come to the same conclusion that David Kay did: there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. We could have used not only the legitimacy but also the cooperation of the United Nations if we had pursued a course of diplomacy. But the President saw only two options: Do nothing or attack Iraq.

Of course, we could not do nothing; indeed, we were not doing nothing. We should have been actively engaged in containment, and not just containment but enforcing the U.N. resolution with inspectors on the ground. We should recall there were U.N. inspectors on the ground inside Iraq and the administration, through their actions, had those inspectors recalled prior to the inception of the military operations. That is a result of this preoccupation with Saddam, the destruction of his regime, the triumph of hope over history.

Then in planning for post-hostilities, the administration most clearly let its hopes triumph over history. They bet that Iraqi gratitude, together with a government of exiles, would provide for a cheap and easy exit strategy. They ignored a history of antagonism among the Sunni, the Shia, and the Kurds. They spoke of a rapidly emerging democracy and market economy in Iraq, a country whose civic life and social institutions had been suppressed for many years. They insinuated exiles of dubious reputations, like Chalabi, who do not command the respect of the Iraqi people. The administration entrusted post-hostility planning to the Department of Defense, not for their expertise, but for their ideological correctness.

One other aspect of the administration's hopes is that our operations in Iraq would have a transformative effect on the region, if not the world. They saw a democratic, market-oriented Iraq as an irresistible attraction and example to the masses of Arabs who hunger for a better way of life. Our success in Iraq would be emulated either by enlightened leaders or rebellious streets. Since we have yet to succeed in creating this new Iraq, it is hard to judge its transformative value. In the very short run, the jury seems to be out.

Furthermore, our engagement in Iraq has limited our strategic flexibility and narrowed our strategic focus. We are paying insufficient attention to a place that is more likely than Iraq to produce that dreaded intersection of "nukes" and terrorists; and that place is North Korea.

We know the North Koreans have nuclear material and the ability to make much more of it, if they have not done so already. Although there does not appear to be any direct links between North Korea and al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations, the North Koreans have a disturbing history of weapons proliferation. Inept at economic development, they have become too adept at trading dangerous weapons to stay afloat or as a means to underscore their demands for international aid.

A few days ago, we concluded another round of international talks with the North Koreans without any apparent breakthrough. As encouraging as these discussions may seem, success-meaning the complete and verifiable elimination of nuclear material and nuclear weapons held by North Korea-can come, in my view, only with more resolute and determined leadership by the President. To date, Iraq seems to have monopolized the effective attention of the President and his inner circle. Failure to resolve the situation in North Korea through diplomacy will result in an intolerable situation that could prompt the consideration of military action. A military option is not appealing, and it may be extraordinarily difficult to carry out with the current open-ended and demanding commitment to Iraq.

In addition, there has been little progress between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In another regional problem area, the Iranians have opened their nuclear program to more robust international inspection but still refuse to moderate their domestic policies and their international rhetoric. Indeed, the hardliners in Iran recently won an election, giving them more clout and marginalizing the reformers within that country, in the wake of our attack against Iraq.

Libya presents an interesting case. Our military success seems to have focused their attention on repairing their relationship with the West. One must be grateful any time a regime effectively renounces weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, Qadhafi's actions seem more like self-preservation than democratization. And, as previously discussed, the "shock and awe" in Iraq did not influence the Afghanis to be more cooperative. In fact, we lost ground in Afghanistan to reconstituted insurgent forces. In the longer run, these hopes of democratic reform and economic renewal in the region and throughout the world will battle historic and cultural forces that may yield, but not without a struggle and not without time.

There are signs that even the administration is coming to recognize that history has overtaken some of their hopes. To minimize the stigma of occupier, the Coalition Provisional Authority has accelerated the transition to sovereignty with a target date of June 30, a date that is more difficult to achieve with each passing day. It remains unclear who they will be returning this sovereignty over to. An interim constitution was adopted apparently today, but there is still a great deal of uncertainty as to who will be the ruling authority and ultimately how this sovereignty will be passed-truly passed-to the Iraqi people.

In recognition of the economic reality of Iraq, the CPA has quietly shelved plans to privatize the Iraqi economy, plans they had initially. Now this would be a wrenching exercise in unemployment since almost every Iraqi directly or indirectly seems to work for a state industry or governmental entity.

The CPA is also deferring serious land reform in a country where land was expropriated from traditional owners and bestowed upon supporters of Saddam. The CPA also seems quietly poised to allow the Kurds to develop an autonomous region under a loose federation, belying the initial commitment to a fully integrated Iraqi state. And still outstanding is whether the Shia majority will ultimately accept the governing arrangements for the new Iraq.

And, having assumed the burden of Iraq, none of these recent pragmatic adjustments are themselves without great dangers. A hasty transfer of sovereignty could lead to a government without legitimacy or one that quickly morphs into a religious and authoritarian regime that does not share our enthusiasm for democracy. This political process becomes an inviting target for insurgents who see disorder as their key ally. Leaving economic restructuring to the Iraqis is probably leaving it undone. Allowing the Kurds to create an autonomous or semiautonomous region will cause consternation within Turkey while adding to the difficulties of the new central government in Baghdad.

This administration has committed the Nation to operations in Iraq. And we cannot fail. Let me emphasize that again. We cannot fail. But we need to recognize that these ideological preoccupations that have led us to Iraq have very real costs. We are spending approximately $4 billion a month to continue our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the bulk of it being spent in Iraq. These costs do not include the heartbreaking loss of American service men and women.

One must question a strategy in which you cannot afford to fail, but you may not win anything. But, questioning aside, one has little choice but to support our forces in the field and insist upon a more pragmatic approach.

First, the administration must increase the overall size of our land forces, not temporarily, but in anticipation of a long deployment in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Last fall, I was able to propose an amendment with my colleague, CHUCK HAGEL, to increase the size of our Army by 10,000 soldiers. It passed on the floor of the Senate but was stripped out of the conference report at the insistence of the administration. They, at that point, failed to recognize the need for more military personnel. Since that time, the administration has indicated that they now recognize a need for additional forces in the Army. But they still continue to insist that it can be paid for out of supplemental appropriations.

I believe we have to prepare for a long stay in Iraq. These new military personnel should be paid for through the budget process, not supplemental appropriations here and there on an irregular basis.

I believe also that in addition to increasing our overall end strength, the administration must increase the number of forces in Iraq and direct those forces to the protection of the Iraqi people, not just to hunt for insurgents. Today, the greatest threat to the successful reconstruction of Iraq is the rampant violence that engulfs the country. Only a small portion of this violence is directed against American forces. The greatest portion is directed against the Iraqi people, creating a daily climate of violence facing every Iraqi which saps their will to remake their country and support our efforts.

Today is a prime example. Over 140 Shiites were killed when bombs exploded in Karbala and Baghdad during a religious holy day. However, the Department of Defense still stubbornly clings to the proposition that more American troops won't help. Rather, they claim that indigenous Iraqi security forces are the answer. So they have created, mostly on paper, Iraqi security forces that are inadequate and insufficient for the critical months ahead.

"Iraqization" has dim echoes of "Vietnamization." Both are political responses to real security problems. One failed; the other is of dubious value at the moment.

Secondly, the administration must candidly and promptly acknowledge the huge costs that are necessary to pursue our international objectives. The recently submitted Presidential budget does not include any funds for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President is attempting to rely on previous supplemental appropriations until the election. Recently, the chiefs of the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force admitted they would run out of funds on October 1 for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. More recently, reports have surfaced that the services may indeed run out of these funds sooner than that. They are now robbing Peter to pay Paul as they scavenge other accounts to fund operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition to funding for our military forces directly, we should understand even at the most optimal success level, military forces will buy you time to deal with the more fundamental problems that cause terrorism, that cause unstable governments, unstable regions. Those costs are also huge: costs in economic development assistance, costs in educational assistance. Those costs have to be factored in also. They are not included effectively or sufficiently in the budget the President sent to us.

As I said, this is not only poor budget policy with regard to military forces, but if we cannot even honestly budget for military operations, how can we marshal the will and the dollars to reinforce military success with the resources for economic development that will address the root causes of the animosity we are confronting.

One measure of the wisdom of any strategy is whether that strategy is sustainable. The administration's choice of a virtually unilateral preemptive attack followed by long-term and expensive nation building is not a strategy that can be easily duplicated. It is especially difficult to sustain without broad-based international support. Ironically, our preoccupation with Iraq might serve as an inhibition as we confront other adversaries. Moreover, our military advantages simply buy us time, precious time, to deal with fundamental issues that create the climate in which terrorism thrives.

Our attention to these issues of education and economic development is necessary now and not just in Iraq. These, too, are expensive undertakings that require international cooperation with strong American leadership. We face great challenges around the world and here at home. But Americans are not strangers to great challenges. We will endure. And with wisdom and courage, we will prevail-the courage we witness every day in the extraordinary valor of our fighting forces.

But the challenges before us require a strategic vision grounded on attention to the compelling threats we face, not the ideological impulses that stir our hearts. These challenges can best be faced with other nations, not alone. These challenges require huge resources and a long-term commitment, not budgetary gimmicks in the short run.

Until the administration acts on these basic principles, our response to real threats will be hobbled by ideology rather than focused by experience.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.