Integrated Deepwater Program Reform Act

Floor Speech

INTEGRATED DEEPWATER PROGRAM REFORM ACT -- (House of Representatives - July 30, 2007)

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Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, I stand in support of H.R. 2722 because I recognize the importance of the Integrated Deepwater Systems (Deepwater) program to our National security.

We need to replace our aging ships and aircraft that operate offshore to protect our borders. While this program has come under much scrutiny for being more expensive than previously thought and taking more time to complete, it is still a worthwhile endeavor.

Everyday, valiant members of the U.S. Coast Guard risk their lives to rescue and protect Americans. The continued success of this mission is dependent upon Coast Guard assets which are aging by the day. In the mid-1990s, the Coast Guard decided to replace all of these assets in a single procurement program--the Integrated Deepwater System program, typically referred to as Deepwater. The Coast Guard's plan was to set forth broad mission requirements and then rely on private contractors to determine the mix of assets necessary to carry out those missions. Ultimately, the contract went to ``Integrated Coast Guard System'' (ICGS), a consortium headed by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.

Deepwater was intended to replace or modernize the approximately 90 ships and 200 Coast Guard aircraft used for missions taking place more than 50 miles offshore. The primary missions carried out in this ``deepwater'' zone are drug and migrant interdiction operations, search and rescue, homeland security, and fisheries law enforcement. Unfortunately, this program has been beset with problems. One part of the ICGS's Deepwater plan was to lengthen the Coast Guard's existing 110 foot patrol boats by 113 feet. Shortly after the first extended boat was delivered, cracks were found in its hull. The Coast Guard dry-docked the boats in December 2006 due to the lack of operational capacity in heavy seas. On February 14, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General released a report concerning whistleblower allegations made against the 123-foot Coast Guard cutter program. The report found that aspects of the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) equipment installed aboard the 123-foot cutters do not meet the design standards set forth in the Deepwater contract.

Specifically, the contractor did not install low smoke cabling aboard the 123-foot cutter, despite a Deepwater contract requirement. The intent of this requirement was to eliminate the polyvinyl chloride jacket encasing the cables, which for years produced toxic fumes and dense smoke during shipboard fire.

Additionally, the contractor installed C4ISR topside equipment aboard both the 123-foot cutters and prosecutors, which either did not comply or was not tested to ensure compliance with specific environmental performance requirements outlined in the Deepwater contract. On April 17, 2007, the Commandant of the Coast Guard announced the decommissioning of the entire 123-foot fleet.

Similarly, there are problems with the National Security Cutter. On January 23, 2007, the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General's Office released a report stating that ``the National Security Cutter, as designed and constructed, would not meet the performance specifications described in the original Deepwater contract.'' The report also states that ``The National Security Cutter's design and performance deficiencies are fundamentally the result of the Coast Guard's failure to exercise technical oversight over the design and construction of its Deepwater assets.''

Furthermore, the Inspector General's Office found that ``since the deepwater contract was signed in June 2002, the combined cost of National Security Cutters 1 and 2 has increased from $517 million to approximately $775 million.'' The $775 estimate does not include costs to correct or mitigate the National Security Cutter's structural design deficiencies, additional labor and materials costs resulting from the effects of Hurricane Katrina, and the final costs of a $302 million Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA) that the Coast Guard is currently negotiating with the contractor. Finally, the report states that the Inspector General's Office ``encountered resistance'' from the Coast Guard and the contractor in its efforts to evaluate the structural design and performance issues associated with the cutter.

The IG's findings are very serious and I am deeply concerned about the Coast Guard's ability to manage the Deepwater program. Strict Congressional oversight on the part of the new Democratic Congress has forced the Coast Guard to make several significant changes to this much-needed program and continued oversight is needed. The Homeland Security Committee has already held one hearing on the Deepwater Program this year, and more are planned.

H.R. 2722 makes improvements to the Deepwater program that will refine the process and make it effective for protecting the homeland for decades to come. For instance this bill creates a process for the Coast Guard to become the lead systems integrator for the program, it opens up competition for procurements, requires the Coast Guard to provide life-cycle cost estimates, requires the appointment of a Chief Acquisitions Officer, establishes testing and certification requirements for Deepwater assets, provides design criteria for the National Security Cutter, and allows the Department of Homeland Security to work with the United States Navy. These changes to the program are necessary to make Deepwater an effective homeland security program.

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