Container Security Challenges and Goals

Container Security Challenges and Goals

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and welcome to Assistant Commissioner Ahern and Director Oxford.

As DHS passes its fourth anniversary, we can see that some areas of the Department are starting to come together, while other areas are continuing to struggle. Just last week, we discussed border security and learned that the SBI is integrating what were disparate components into a more functional and effective organization - a clear example of how the integration potential of DHS is producing real results.

So today we are here to discuss cargo container security - an issue that transcends many components across the Department, an issue where robust progress is of paramount importance, and an issue that this Subcommittee took aggressive action on in the FY 07 DHS Appropriations Act. Last year, as we looked at the issue of port, cargo, and container security, we were struck by several things:

1. The responsibilities span across no less than seven, major Departmental components, including: CBP, ICE, TSA, Coast Guard, S&T, Grants and Training, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.

The myriad of local and state agencies involved with responding to, or preventing, a terrorist attack at any one of our nation's ports adds to the complexity. At Maryland's Port of Baltimore, for example, there are at least another seven agencies with security responsibilities including state and local emergency management, law enforcement and fire departments.

2. Despite the establishment of many noteworthy programs, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), sustained, measurable improvement of the nation's port and commerce security as a whole remained unclear. And,

3. There was no strategic plan that comprehensively addressed the roles, responsibilities, and required resources of all Departmental components in providing for controlled access to U.S. ports, the integrity of the supply chain, and the physical integrity of U.S. ports.

To address this issue, the Subcommittee provided over $4.3 billion for DHS' port security related programs and withheld $5 million from the Secretary's personal office until an extensive strategic plan for port, cargo, and container security was submitted.

This plan was required to:

Double the amount of inbound cargo currently inspected;

* Screen all inbound cargo through the Automated Targeting System;
* Establish minimum security standards for cargo containers; and
* Contain FY 07 performance requirements for CBP, that will:

-Double the amount of cargo screened for radiation
-Review all manifests of cargo going thru a CSI port; and
-Validate all trusted shippers in the C-TPAT program.

So I think it is obvious that we believed this issue was of the utmost importance and in need of a strategic focus - a belief that was supported by the overwhelmingly bi-partisan SAFE Port Act passed by the previous Congress. Today, I want to discuss this focus and how it is being applied to the security of cargo containers.

I want to hear how CBP and DNDO are transitioning from promising, initial plans to programs with real teeth. It is our understanding, that by the end of FY 08, you expect to grow CSI to 58 foreign seaports, covering 85% of inbound cargo, and deploy enough radiation detection equipment to scan 98% of cargo transiting our domestic land and sea ports - this is the type of progress I hope to discuss in detail today.

I have long held the view that the security vulnerability of our ports is not in the facilities themselves, but in the 11 million containers that transit the ports every year - an enormous moving haystack that could conceal a deadly needle. Gentlemen, it is your responsibility to find this proverbial needle in the haystack and prevent it from causing real harm, and in a way that does not bring the American economic engine to a grinding halt.

It is absolutely fundamental that in the post-9/11 era, we must ensure the integrity of legitimate trade through effective and efficient supply-chain security. So DHS is certainly defining the Federal role in port security through notable initiatives and the deployment of sophisticated detection equipment.

But measurable results are required to ensure this role is not just defined, but also realized. I know this task is enormous, but I am confident you have the capability and the will to overcome this challenge. I assure you, no one wants to see you succeed more than the Members of this Subcommittee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

http://halrogers.house.gov/Read.aspx?ID=117