Procedural Tactics
PROCEDURAL TACTICS -- (Senate - February 07, 2007)
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Mr. REED. Mr. President, we have come to a critical crossroads with respect to our operations in Iraq. After the Iraq Study Group spent months considering the issue of the best policy going forward, suggesting a phased redeployment along with other measures, diplomatic measures that would enhance the security of the United States and protect our soldiers there in Iraq, the President had the opportunity to accept those recommendations. It was a bipartisan panel of eminent Americans--James Baker and Lee Hamilton and so many others. The President specifically rejected them, not just in substance but in tone. In his speech a few weeks ago, he declared that he had learned very little from the Iraq Study Group, that he was not committed to a phased redeployment, he was committed to an escalation of approximately 20,000 troops and a change in tactics in Baghdad.
I think he had the opportunity at that moment to do several things. First, he could have accepted the wisdom of the Iraq Study Group. But, more important, he could have communicated to the American public that his policy was based on the reality in Iraq, that he had learned from a series of mistakes he and his administration had made, and that he could have sustained a way forward in Iraq. He didn't do that, and I think the American people reacted as they should have reacted, with declining confidence in his leadership and, frankly, posing the fundamental question of, How does one sustain any policy when 70 percent of the U.S. population considers it to be erroneous and not in the best interests of this country going forward? I believe the President squandered the last opportunity he had to rally people behind his policy.
Now we are in the midst of a debate, we hope, about that policy. We are being stymied in terms of bringing this to the floor in a clear and clarion vote that tells the American people where we stand as individual Senators with respect to the President's plan for escalation. We are being frustrated in the sense that there is an attempt to present other issues and not the issue of the moment, the issue under debate. There is no debate about our support for American soldiers around the globe and marines and sailors and airmen and airwomen. We support them. We think their mission should be changed to protect them and to advance the interests of our country, but there is no stinting in our support of these valiant young Americans.
The issue which divides this Senate and the issue which captures the feelings and the passions of the American public is whether we will stand in approval or disapproval of the President's proposal to escalate forces in Iraq. I believe that vote should come. That vote should be clear. The vote should stand by itself, not shrouded by other measures that are designed not to address the concerns of American people but simply to give the President additional cover.
What has happened since the last 3-plus years, from the invasion of Iraq--indeed, preceding the invasion of Iraq, in this Senate, under the control of the Republicans, has not done a good job at all of oversight, of investigation, of asking critical questions. Where was the Republican leadership, in the fall of 2002 and early 2003, when they should have been asking a simple question: What if we win the conventional battle? What about the occupation? Where is the plan? Where are the resources? How many Americans will it take to secure a large country with a population of about 26 million people, with a history of intersectarian tensions, with a history of a colonial past under the British that has established, some would say artificially, the boundaries of this nation? Those questions were not asked seriously and consistently and, as a result, this administration made huge mistakes when it came to the issue of how to successfully translate a conventional victory against the Iraqi military forces into a successful transition to a stable country. Now we see Iraq enthralled in doubt and violence that seems to be unable to be quenched. Our American forces are in the middle of that.
It is interesting, when we come to this point, to look seriously at the National Intelligence Estimate. One of the grave deficiencies we recognize today--some of us recognized it in October of 2002--is that the intelligence being used to sell this operation was flawed. Now I think we have a much more precise and carefully adjusted view of what is happening in Iraq today.
If you look at the NIE, it presents to us some profound contradictions.
First, and I agree with this assessment, is that the violence today is principally the result of sectarian conflict. The accelerators that raise the tempo of this violence can be found in the insurgent groups, al-Qaida in Iraq, some of these Shia militias, but the underlying battles today are between sectarian groups. The NIE describes this as a winner-take-all approach, as an existential battle between Shias--who feel a sense of insecurity given the history, particularly the last decade, of total oppression by a Sunni minority--and Sunnis, who feel a sense of entitlement that is going to be frustrated by the new, emerging order in Iraq. These existential battles, as the NIE indicates, are in a sense self-sustaining.
But here is where the confusion, the conflict, the contradiction comes about. Most of the remedies we are all talking about involve reconciliation--political sectarian reconciliation. The issue--and one which will be decided in the next months and weeks in Iraq--is, can any existential conflict ever be reconciled? Has this conflict reached a point where it is truly self-sustaining and our forces in the middle of it are unable to be a moderating force at all?
My view and the view of so many others is that when you look at this situation on the ground and you consider what can be done, the decisive actions must be those of the Iraqi Government. They are political actions; that the presence of our military forces is important but not decisive. Certainly the size of our military forces is probably not as decisive as actions that must be undertaken by the Maliki government reining in the militias, truly trying to reach out beyond this huge sectarian chasm for reconciliation. These political, economic, and social decisions are not going to be made simply because we have increased our presence in Baghdad by 20 percent or we have changed the tactics.
Another aspect of this debate is the concentration, almost exclusively, on the military aspects of the President's plan. That, frankly, has been one of the great shortcomings and faults of the administration--and of this and previous Congresses, I should say--in terms of our approach in Iraq. Any military commander on the ground will tell you that they are buying time and that time has to be used for economic progress and political progress. The component in the President's plan that I heard stresses an increase of 20,000 soldiers, but where is the progress in terms of not only Iraqi decisionmakers making tough decisions but American advisers--State Department officials, USAID officials, Justice Department officials--going over there to help start the other side, the other part of the process, the economic progress, the social progress, the political mentoring? That has never been the case. As a result, our strategy has failed consistently.
Unless this plan has complementary and reinforcing elements--military, political, and economic--it, too, will fail. I do not see, frankly, the complementary political and economic support necessary to carry off this plan.
What we have is 20,000 troops. If you look at the doctrine--and it is interesting because General Petraeus, the designated commander, is one of the principal authors of this new doctrine--that doctrine today would call for 120,000 troops in Baghdad based upon the size in Baghdad. We are sending an additional 20,000, which means our presence, American presence, is about 30,000 troops. The Iraqis have committed to roughly 55,000 troops, which brings us to a total of 85,000, but that still is roughly 35,000 troops short of the doctrine.
In addition, I don't think anyone considers that the Iraqi forces can truly muster 55,000 effective troops. We have already seen the reports come in that brigades, Iraqi brigades, are showing up at 50 percent strength, and of those, one has to ask seriously how many are effective fighters. Where are the shortcomings? If it is half a brigade and they are all privates and corporals, that is not an effective fighting force, or if it is half a fighting brigade and they are all majors and lieutenant colonels, that is not an effective fighting force. So we are seeing a situation, even in military terms, where this surge is probably lacking significantly in terms of the size of the force.
In addition, we all understand that there is a divided command. One of the key issues in any military operation is unity of command. There is an Iraqi commander who is selected probably for his political reliability more than his tactical or technical skill. There is also a situation in that our new tactics require significantly more enablers. These enablers are the translators, the civil affairs officers, the combat service support officers to supply these outposts now in each neighborhood. In fact, the Government Accountability Office has done a report indicating that if a 21,000 increment is made, it might turn out to be closer to 50,000 if you truly have all the support troops you need to get the job done.
There are so many shortcomings in just the political and military aspects of this plan. So I believe, again, this is an opportunity, a moment we have to address this plan, this proposal of the President's, in a very serious way and take a stand on it one way or the other.
I hope we can do that. I hope we can do that in the intervening days, certainly before the end of this month, or the end of, I hope, this week.
Now, I think there are other aspects that are important to consider when we talk about the situation as we go forward. I will go back to the point I think hindered us consistently throughout our operations in Iraq, and that is despite the extraordinary valor and technical skill of our military forces, they have never been truly complemented by non-Department of Defense personnel, by the State Department officials, by the Agriculture officials. I can recall visiting Fallujah twice in the middle of Anbar Province. Those marines are doing a magnificent job along with many Army units that are there. There is one State Department official in Fallujah who is charged with mentoring, with advice, with reconstruction, with all of these things. That is not adequate, and I don't see any indication in the President's proposal that is going to change. This is all about, again, trying to take a military solution to what is a complicated military, political, and economic problem. It hasn't worked for 3 years, it is not likely to work, and I think we have to take a stand on that proposal.
One of the other consequences I think that is ensuing from this focus on a purely military approach is we are losing out in terms of diplomatic leverage in the region. Just this week, the Saudis are meeting with delegates from Hamas and Fatah and the Palestinian Authority because the American leadership has been so lacking. We have to, I think, have a diplomatic policy to complement anything we do within Iraq. We haven't done that and it does not appear to be part of the President's agenda.
We have a situation which is grievous and which I think requires something more than simply more of the same, and that is just about what the President is offering. This is not a brand new diplomatic initiative; this is not a large-scale economic push to complement military action; this is a modest increase of forces, although I think this increase is not justified, together with new tactics in Baghdad. But again, I don't think that is going to be sufficient action. We have to start looking beyond the next several weeks and down the next several months and, indeed, the next several years.
The strategy that I think is inevitable is a phased redeployment of our forces and renewed diplomatic activity. It represents a focus on missions that are more central to the defense of the United States. The first is continue to aggressively go after those international terrorists, the al-Qaida units. We have done that. We continue, as the military indicates, to obtrude them very successfully. In fact, there are similarities of that mission to the recently conducted operations in Somalia where we sent in aircraft with some liaison from local Ethiopian forces on the ground to go out and take out identified terrorists there. That mission should continue in Iraq and frankly in Somalia and many other places where we can identify and find international terrorists.
Second, we have a continuing obligation, I think, to strengthen the Iraqi security forces. Ultimately it is their battle. We have made some progress with the Army, but we have to make more progress. That is a mission we should undertake and continue.
Third, there is the obligation, I think, to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq, to make sure the locals do not take advantage of what is a tumultuous situation within Iraq. That, too, I think, is a valid mission, and it can be performed much differently than we are proposing to conduct this mission in Baghdad, by redeploying forces within Iraq. In fact, it was interesting yesterday before the Armed Services Committee when Secretary Gates was asked, and I think it was by Senator Warner: Is this the last chance? If this fails, then all is lost? I think he quite authoritatively and thoughtfully said: No, of course, we have to have contingencies. Of course, there are other approaches we can take. Of course, there are other missions that can be assigned.
One of the dangers and one of the persistent aspects of the President's rhetoric has been always summoning up the false dichotomy. Recall, back in October 2002, what was the choice the President proposed? Invade Iraq or do nothing and let Saddam and the terrorists win. We recall the rhetoric. It seems hollow now when we think back to it. What was left out of the equation, of course, was what was already being done: international inspectors of the United Nations on the ground in Iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction, supposedly the source of our great conflict with the Iraq regime.
There are other things that could have been done, too, much short of an invasion. There were, in fact, reports of terrorist activities. Zarqawi was in the Kurdish region. What would have prevented the United States from launching a very discrete military operation against Zarqawi in the fall of 2002 in the Kurdish area, an area we were helping to protect by our overflights of aircraft? Nothing, except, I believe, the administration didn't want to give up a good rhetorical device: this supposed terrorist presence in a part of Iraq that Saddam did not control.
Again, here now, it is back to the false choices: Surge 20,000 troops or watch the country collapse as we leave precipitously next week. That is not the choice. The choice is missions that are more effectively aligned with our national security interests: going after terrorists, training Iraqi security forces, protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq, complemented with active diplomatic actions, complemented with, we hope, progress by the Iraqis themselves in political decisionmaking. That, I think, is the way to go.
We have, again, I think a very difficult situation before us. It requires not only debate, but I think it requires at this moment a decision by the Senate on a very simple proposal: where we stand
with respect to the President's proposal for escalation. Now, others have come to the floor and pointed out past statements that have been made with respect to increasing American forces. I have been open to these arguments. Frankly, at this juncture I don't feel persuaded. In the past, when someone had asked me: Would you increase the size of forces in Iraq, certainly in those first few days after the invasion, and after July of 2003 when I visited Iraq and found there were thousands of weapons dumps that were not being protected, I came back here and I think, along with Senator Hagel, was one of the first to call for an increased size of our Army so we could deploy more forces to Iraq. But that window has closed very dramatically and nothing, frankly, was done by the administration to respond to those concerns.
I have said publicly that if a commander in the field came to me and said: We need additional forces, I would look at that proposal very carefully. In fact, in a press conference I was asked:
So in no way would you be on board with the McCain plan to surge in with, you know, 50,000 strong additional forces on the ground, you would not be in favor of that?
My response:
I think I responded to the question before, that if the military commanders in Iraq said we need for X number of months 20 plus, 25,000 troops to do this mission and within reasonable certainty was assessed, I would have to listen to that proposal, sir.
Well, I have listened to that proposal and I find it wanting. I find it wanting, based on the doctrine of the U.S. Army as it has evolved today. I find it wanting because of the lack of complementary and civilian support for that proposal. I find it wanting because of the lack of any serious indication that the Government of Iraq will make those tough political decisions. So I have considered it as I said I would, but I don't think it is the right way to proceed. Not at all.
Now, I am not alone, and I don't think it would be a shock to anyone to suggest this issue of escalation has prompted criticism from a wide group of individuals. GEN Colin L. Powell, former Secretary of State, said in December:
I am not persuaded that another surge of troops into Baghdad for the purposes of suppressing this sectarian violence, this civil war, will work.
Again, I think General Powell's insights and experience are very critical at this moment.
The Joint Chiefs indicated, at least as reported in the Washington Post in December, using anonymous White House sources, that they were opposed, that White House officials are aggressively promoting the concept over the unanimous disagreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is in December.
Time Magazine reported that General Abizaid said he opposes more troops because it would discourage Iraqis from taking responsibility for their own security. Here is a general, an officer who has served for decades, the most knowledgeable individual when it comes to Middle East military-political issues within the United States Army, within the Department of Defense, and that is his opinion.
Robert Gates--before he became Secretary of Defense, or before he was confirmed, according to two administration officials asking not to be named--Robert Gates expressed his skepticism about a troop surge in Iraq on his first day on the job--excuse me; he was Secretary of Defense--at a Pentagon meeting overseeing the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines.
We are not alone. There have been some perhaps eleventh-hour conversions for this surge, but I think there are a number of individuals with significant experience and insight, unquestioned patriots, who question this proposal.
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