Arms Sales Notification

Floor Speech

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is still available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications that have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such an annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Department of State, Washington, DC. transmittal of a determination to congress

Please find enclosed a Determination and accompanying documentation from the Department of State.

Title of DETERMINATION: Determination under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.

Background: Consistent with section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, the Department of State wishes to inform you that the Secretary has exercised his delegated authority, as described in the enclosed Memorandum of Justification, to authorize the immediate transfer of U.S.- origin defense articles to the Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.

Recipients:

Speaker of the House

President of the Senate

Chairman, SFRC and Ranking Minority Member

Chairman, HFAC and Ranking Minority Member Sincerely, Paul Guaglianone, Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of Legislative Affairs.

Enclosure. ____

DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 36(b)(1) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, I hereby determine an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale through the following foreign military sales cases, including any further amendments specific to the cost, quantity, or requirements of these cases, in the national security interest of the United States:

For Bahrain:

PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T

For Israel:

APKWS-II

For Kuwait:

PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T

Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS)

For Qatar:

PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T

APKWS-II

For the UAE:

PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T

APKWS-II

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register and, along with the accompanying Memorandum of Justification, shall be transmitted to Congress with the applicable notifications. Marco Rubid, Secretary of State. ____ memorandum of justification for emergency arms transfers to bahrain,

kuwait, qatar, the united arab emirates, and israel, under section 36(b)(1) of the arms export control act.

On February 28, 2016, the United States and Israel launched a broad and joint operation against the Iranian regime to remove the existential threat it poses to the United States, Israel, the Middle East. and the world. This historic operation is a defining point in the region's military operations and the region's cooperation with the United States in a fight against a destabilizing regime.

Despite the combined successes of Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Rising Lion to cripple Iran's ability to project power and terror in 2025, the Iranian regime has not abandoned its plans. In the eight months since the Twelve-Day War, the regime restored damaged nuclear infrastructure, accelerated missile production, and continued to finance, train, and arm its proxies throughout the Middle East, while at the same time combating its internal civil crisis and large-scale protests with excessive and deadly force. The combination of accelerated reconstruction of nuclear infrastructure, its ba]listic missile stockpile, and its continued circumvention of sanctions created a new reality in the Iranian arena. These trends led to the decision to launch Operation Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, with the aim of halting the regime's attempts to reconstitute its instruments of power.

Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE all have sustained hundreds of direct and ongoing ballistic missile and drone strikes since the start of Operation Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, and they have suffered civilian or military fatalities. In Bahrain, Iran has conducted hundreds of strikes against Isa Air Base, the Bahrain International Airport, and one of Bahrain's major oil refinery complexes. In Kuwait, Iran has launched attacks against Embassy Kuwait, Camp Buehring, airport fuel tanks, and government buildings, killing at least seven U.S. service members. Qatar has suffered significant impacts to its liquified natural gas facilities due to Iranian strikes, which have resulted in an estimated $20 billion in lost annual revenue on top of strikes against Al Udeid Air Base. In the UAE, Iran has targeted Al Dahfra Air Base, U.S. diplomatic facilities, Emirati airports, ports, and oil infrastructure. Israel has weathered the most waves of Iranian and proxy attacks on military, industrial, and residential infrastructure.

These countries have demonstrated strong collaboration with CENTCOM to not only protect each country's sovereignty and citizens, but also to protect U.S. citizens, servicemen and women, and assets in country. Bahrain. Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE have all successfully intercepted many attacks using the U.S.-provided Patriot system. All five countries have experienced countless attacks by one-way attack drones and are utilizing U.S. provided interceptors and munitions to counter these attacks.

These countries are essential defense and security partners, and the United States is committed to ensuring our partners have the means to defend themselves. The Departments of State and War are coordinating with Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to meet their military requirements and ensure their needs are met to defend their territory and citizens, as well as Americans living, working, and traveling in the region.

Given the scale and scope of the regional conflict, it is in the U.S. national security interest to swiftly provide Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE with the systems they require to defend themselves and to reinforce deterrence against other regional threats. The immediacy of the challenge at hand requires overcoming the statutory 30-day Congressional notification timeline to expedite transfers to Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.

For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists requiring immediate provision of these defense articles to Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE in the national security interest of the United States. These transfers, through foreign military sales, will provide needed defense capabilities to Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE as soon as possible. The Secretary of State, therefore, has certified an emergency exists under sections 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, thereby waving the Congressional review requirement of these provisions. Transmittal No. 26-0Z Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology or Capability (Sec. 36(b)(5)(C), AECA)

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Bahrain.

(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 19-06; Date: May 3, 2019; Implementing Agency: Army.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description: On May 3, 2019, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 19-06 of the possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, of sixty (60) Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles; thirty- six (36) Patriot MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T) with canisters; nine (9) M903 Launching Stations; five (5) Antenna Mast Groups; three (3) Electrical Power Plants III; two (2) AN/MPQ-65 radar sets; and two (2) AN/MSQ-132 Engagement Control Stations. The following non-major defense equipment (MDE) items were also included: communications equipment; tools and test equipment; range and test programs; support equipment; prime movers; generators; publications and technical documentation; training equipment; spare and repair parts; personnel training; Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT); U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services; Systems Integration and Checkout (SICO); field office support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total value was $2.478 billion. MDE constituted $1.445 billion of this total.

This transmittal notifies the inclusion of the following MDE items: one hundred fifty (150) Patriot MIM-104E GEM-T with canisters; and fifty (50) PAC-3 MSE missiles. The following non-MDE items will also be included: communications equipment; tools and test equipment; range and test programs; support equipment; prime movers; generators; publications and technical documentation; training equipment; spare and repair parts; personnel training; TAFT; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services; SICO; field office support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total value of the new items is $1.625 billion. The estimated MDE value will increase by $1.125 billion to a revised $2.57 billion. The estimated non-MDE value will increase by $500 million to a revised $1.533 billion. The estimated total case value will increase by $1.625 billion to a revised $4.103 billion. MDE constitutes $2.57 billion of this total.

(iv) Significance: The inclusion of this MDE represents an increase in capability over what was previously notified. The proposed sale will enhance Bahrain's interoperability with the United States. Bahrain will use Patriot missiles to improve its missile defense capability, defend its territorial integrity, and deter regional threats.

(v) Justification: This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a major non-NATO ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(vi) Sensitivity of Technology:

The Sensitivity of Technology Statement contained in the original notification applies to items reported here.

The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

(vii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026. Transmittal No. 26-CH Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Israel.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment ^* $675.2 million.

Other $317.2 million.

Total $992.4 million.

Funding Source: Foreign Military Financing.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Ten thousand (10,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II All Up Round

Non-MDE:

The following non-MDE items will also be included: test support equipment; other support equipment; technical data; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (IS-P-AVW).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.

^* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act. POLICY JUSTIFICATION Israel--Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II All-Up-Round

The Government of Israel has requested to buy ten thousand (10,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II All Up Round. The following non-major defense equipment items will also be included: test support equipment; other support equipment; technical data; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $992.4 million.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a strategic regional partner that has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The proposed sale will improve Israel's capability to meet current and future threats, strengthen its homeland defense, and serve as a deterrent to regional threats. Israel will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, located in Nashua, NH. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Israel.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. Transmittal No. 26-CH Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II (APKWS-II) All Up Round is a low cost air-to-air and air-to-ground system that consists of an APKWS-II guidance section developed by BAE Systems, legacy 2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket motor, and legacy MK152 and MK435/436 warhead/fuse. The APKWS-II is a tactical rocket system that can be launched from several platforms, offering multi-mission, multi-target capability and precision-strike lethality. These guided rockets are steered to the target by following reflected laser beam energy directed onto the target either by the launching aircraft, a second aircraft, or ground based troops operating a laser designator.

2. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that Israel can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Israel. Transmittal No. 26-1A Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology or Capability (Sec. 36(b)(5)(C), AECA)

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Kuwait.

(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 20-16; Date: May 28, 2020; Implementing Agency: Army.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description: On May 28, 2020, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 20-16 of the possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, of eighty-four (84) Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancements (MSEs) with canisters; two (2) Patriot MSE test missiles 2-pack per unit of issue; thirty-five (35) remanufactured (upgrades): Patriot modification kit, missile launchers A902+ Series to A903 Series; twenty-six (26) PAC-3 Missile Round Trainer; and twenty-six (26) Empty Round Trainer. The following non-major defense equipment (MDE) items were also included: Flight Test Target--Zombie; PAC-3 missile spares held in Continental United States for repair and return; PAC-3 telemetry kits; training devices; simulators; transportation; organizational equipment; spare and repair parts; support equipment; tools and test equipment; technical data and publications; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated total value was $800 million. MDE constituted $700 million of this total.

This transmittal notifies the inclusion of the following MDE items: five hundred (500) PAC-3 MSEs; and five hundred (500) PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Tactical Missiles (GEM-T) with canisters. The following non-MDE items will also be included: tools and test equipment; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; spare and repair parts; facility design; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics, sustainment, and program support. The estimated total value of the new items is $9.3 billion. The estimated MDE value will increase by $8.2 billion to a revised $8.9 billion. The estimated non-MDE value will increase by $1.1 billion to a revised $1.2 billion. The estimated total case value will increase by $9.3 billion to a revised $ 10.1 billion. MDE constitutes $8.9 billion of this total.

(iv) Significance: This notification accounts for requested additional MDE and non-MDE items not included in the original notification. The inclusion of this MDE represents an increase in capability over what was previously notified. This proposed sale will improve Kuwait's capability to strengthen its homeland air defense by better meeting current and future air threats.

(v) Justification: This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major non-NATO ally that has been an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(vi) Sensitivity of Technology:

The PAC-2 GEM-T missiles with canisters is a specialized variant of the Patriot Missile Defense System designed to intercept high-speed tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and enemy aircraft. The GEM-T uses a blast- fragmentation warhead. It detonates in the immediate vicinity of a target to destroy it with shrapnel and explosive force. It uses track-via missile guidance, where the missile relays target data back to the ground radar for processing, and the ground station sends steering commands back to the missile.

The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

(ix) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026. Transmittal No. 26-CR Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Kuwait.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment ^* $1.5 billion.

Other $1.0 billion.

Total $2.5 billion.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Six (6) dismounted Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) engagement operations centers (EOCs)

Two (2) hosted IBCS EOCs

Six (6) dismounted IBCS integrated collaborative environments (ICEs)

Two (2) hosted IBCS ICEs

Fourteen (14) mounted IBCS integrated fire control network relays

Eight (8) engagement control station to radar interface unit modification kits

Thirty-five (35) launcher integrated network kit on enhanced launcher electronic system (ELES) kits

Twenty-four (24) KIV 77 or 79 identification, friend or foe encryptors

Non-MDE:

The following non-MDE items will also be included: communications equipment; tools and test equipment; support equipment; generators; vehicles; transportation; construction; publications and technical documentation; training equipment including the air defense reconfigurable trainer; spare and repair parts; personnel training; technical assistance field team; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and services, IBCS Phase 2 planning, engineering, and logistics support services; systems integration and checkout; field office support; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army (KU-B-UZJ).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.

^*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act. POLICY JUSTIFICATION Kuwait--Integrated Battle Command System Enabled Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target

The Government of Kuwait has requested to purchase six (6) dismounted Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) engagement operations centers (EOC); two (2) hosted IBCS EOCs; six (6) dismounted IBCS integrated collaborative environments (ICE); two (2) hosted IBCS ICEs; fourteen (14) mounted IBCS integrated fire unit modification kits; thirty-five (35) launcher integrated network kits on enhanced launcher electronic system kits; and twenty-four (24) KIV 77 or 79 identification, friend or foe encryptors. The following non- major defense equipment items will also be included: communications equipment; tools and test equipment; support equipment; generators; vehicles; transportation; publications and technical documentation; training equipment including the air defense reconfigurable trainer; spare and repair parts; personnel training; technical assistance field team; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and services, IBCS Phase 2 planning, engineering, and logistics support services; systems integration and checkout; transportation; field office support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $2.5 billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major non-NATO ally that has been an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The proposed sale will improve Kuwait's capability to meet current and future threats by providing advanced air defense detection as part of the procurement of the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense sensor radar system combined with the integration of the IBCS as the command and control and thereby providing a layered defense capability. This enhanced capability will protect Kuwait and local allied land forces and will significantly improve Kuwait's contribution to Integrated Air Missile Defense. Kuwait will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors will be Northrop Grumman, located in Falls Church, VA; RTX Corporation, located in Arlington, VA; and Lockheed-Martin, located in Dallas, TX. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor(s).

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require permanent assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Kuwait.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. Transmittal No. 26-CR Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Configuration 3+ Increment 3 Radar Interface Unit (RIU) provides operational control of the Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) MPQ-65 radar set (RS). The RIU is an adapted PATRIOT AN/MSQ-132 Configuration 3+ Increment 3 engagement control station with a PATRIOT A-kit modification added. The RIU exchanges componentized PATRIOT sensor messages with the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) B-side component, either the engagement operations center (EOC) or the integrated fire control network (IFCN) relay, via the AB interface control document (ICD) directed messages. These messages include tracking measurement data, feature data, engagement support, uplink and downlink support, state and mode transition, radar status, initialization data, etc. The RIU converts AB ICD messages into internal current force PATRIOT RS radar action messages and radar response messages, allowing the radar resident portion of the PATRIOT componentized sensor to remain unchanged.

2. The Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD) IBCS adapts existing and forthcoming air and missile defense (AMD) sensors, weaponry, and mission command technologies into a unified defense system. This integration facilitates a comprehensive air picture, enhances defended areas, and provides flexible deployment options. The IBCS serves as the command-and-control solution (C4ISR) for AIAMD, providing net centric, plug & fight (P&F), and system-of-systems command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance. and reconnaissance. IBCS comprises two primary components: the EOC and the IBCS IFCN relays. The EOC delivers C4ISR functions at battalion, battery, and platoon levels within the AMD task force. Both the EOC and IFCN relays are equipped with a P&F B-Kit, enabling AIAMD weapon and sensor components to operate within the networked system. These components connect via an A-Kit to interface with the IBCS B-Kit.

3. The Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) enhances defense effectiveness by using composite tracks from multiple sensors to provide accurate target tracking and weapon firing solutions. It offers a common engagement center and data sharing across all Army AMD echelons, improving response to threats with near real-time coordination. The AIAMD architecture ensures resilient defense with automatic fail- over and rapid reconfiguration, minimizing single point failures. IBCS supports dynamic defense design, extended range, and non-line-of-sight engagements, reducing coverage gaps, manpower, and costs while improving training capabilities.

4. Identification, friend or foe KIV-77 or KIV-79 encryptors is a combat identification system designed for command and control. It uses a transponder that listens to an interrogation signal and then sends a response that identifies the broadcaster.

5. Six (6) AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loader--Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense sensor is an advanced secure cryptographic device, enabling safe distribution and storage of communication security keys.

6. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

7. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

8. A determination has been made that Kuwait can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

9. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Kuwait. Transmittal No. 26-CG Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment^* $3.95 billion.

Other $0.06 billion.

Total $4.01 billion.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment {MDE):

Two hundred (200) Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept On Target (PATRIOT) Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) Guidance Enhanced Missiles-Tactical.

Three hundred (300) PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement.

Non-MDE:

The following non-MDE items will also be included: PAC-2 and PAC-3 missile and ground support equipment spare parts; classified and unclassified repair and return; PAC-2 and PAC- 3 missile canister consumables; PAC-3 field surveillance program; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics technical assistance; quality assurance; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Army QA-B-UAH.

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: QA-B-UAP.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(Vlll) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.

^*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act. POLICY JUSTIFICATION Government of Qatar--PATRIOT Missile Replenishment of National Stockpile

The Government of Qatar has requested to buy two hundred (200) Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept On Target (PATRIOT) Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical; and three hundred (300) PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement. The following non-major defense equipment items will also be included: PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles and ground support equipment spare parts; classified and unclassified repair and return; PAC-2 and PAC-3 missile canister consumables; PAC-3 field surveillance program; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics technical assistance; quality assurance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $4.01 billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The proposed sale will improve Qatar's capability to meet current and future threats by enabling Qatar to operate in bilateral and multilateral coalition environments and providing enhanced interoperability with U.S. military units for training and defense. Qatar will use the PATRIOT missile system to replenish its missile defense capability, defend its territorial integrity, and deter threats for regional stability.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin, located in Dallas, TX; and RTX Corporation, located in Arlington, VA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractors.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Qatar.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. Transmittal No. 26-CG Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept On Target (PATRIOT) Advanced Capability (PAC-2) Guidance Enhanced Missiles-Tactical (GEM-T) missile is a specialized variant of the PATRIOT Missile Defense System designed to intercept high-speed tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and enemy aircraft. The GEM-T uses a blast-fragmentation warhead. It detonates in the immediate vicinity of a target to destroy it with shrapnel and explosive force. Using track-via-missile guidance, the missile relays target data back to the ground radar for processing and the ground station sends steering commands back to the missile.

2. The PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhanced (MSE) missile is a small, highly agile, kinetic kill interceptor for defense against tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-breathing threats. The MSE variant of the PAC-3 missile represents the next generation in hit-to-kill interceptors and provides expanded battlespace against evolving threats. The PAC-3 MSE improves upon the original PAC-3 capability with a higher performance solid rocket motor, modified lethality enhancer, more responsible control surfaces, upgraded guidance software, and insensitive munitions improvements.

The PAC-3 MSE missile has sensitive and critical technology primarily in the area of design and production know-how and data inherent to certain components.

3. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

4. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

5. A determination has been made that Qatar can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

6. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Qatar. Transmittal No. 26-CN Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Qatar.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment^* $675.2 million.

Other $317.2 million.

Total $992.4 million.

Funding Source: National Funds

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Ten thousand (10,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II all-up-rounds Advanced (Single Variant)

Non-MDE:

The following non-MDE items will also be included: LAU-131 A/A launchers; Mk-152 high explosive warheads; MK66 rocket motors; proximity fuzes; WTU-1/B practice warheads; inert MK66 rocket motors; support equipment; other support equipment; publications and technical documentation; transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (QA-P-AAI), Air Force (QA-D- QAS).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: QA-B-WYX.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.

^* As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act. POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Qatar--Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II All-Up-Round

The Government of Qatar has requested to buy ten thousand (10,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II all-up- rounds advanced (single variant). The following non-major defense equipment items will also be included: LAU-131 A/A launchers; Mk-152 high explosive warheads; MK66 rocket motors; proximity fuzes; WTU-1/B practice warheads; inert MK66 rocket motors; support equipment; other support equipment; publications and technical documentation; transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $992.4 million.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a strategic regional partner that has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The proposed sale will improve Qatar's capability to meet current and future threats, strengthen its homeland defense, and serve as a deterrent to regional threats. Qatar will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, located in Nashua, NH. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Qatar.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. Transmittal No. 26-CN Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(l) of the Arms Export Control Act Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II (APKWS-II) all-up-round is a low cost air-to-air and air-to-ground system that consists of an APKWS-II guidance section developed by BAE Systems, legacy 2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket motor, and legacy MK152 and MK435/436 warhead/fuse. The APKWS-II is a tactical rocket system that can be launched from several platforms, offering multi-mission, multi-target capability and precision-strike lethality. These guided rockets are steered to the target by following reflected laser beam energy directed onto the target either by the launching aircraft, a second aircraft, or ground-based troops operating a laser designator.

2. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that Qatar can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of Qatar. Transmittal No. 26-0V Report of Enhancement or Upgrade of Sensitivity of Technology or Capability (Sec. 36(B)(5)(C), AECA)

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Sec. 36(b)(1), AECA Transmittal No.: 19-37; Date: May 3, 2019; Implementing Agency: Army.

Funding Source: National Funds

(iii) Description: On May 3, 2019, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 19-37 of the possible sale, under Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, of up to four hundred fifty-two (452) Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE). Also included were tools and test equipment; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; spare and repair parts; facility design; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total value was $2.728 billion Major Defense Equipment (MDE) constituted $82.70 billion of this total.

On September 28, 2021, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 21-OC of the inclusion of an additional five hundred ten (510) PAC-3 MSE (included 10 fly-to-buy missiles). The following non-MDE items were also included: tools and test equipment; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; spare and repair parts; facility design; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics, sustainment, and program support. The estimated MDE value was increased by $2.728 billion to a revised $5.428. The estimated total case value was increased by $3.172 billion to a revised $5.90 billion. MDE constituted $5.428 billion of this total.

On March 19, 2026, Congress was notified by congressional certification transmittal number 25-01 of the increase in value due to cost increases. There were no additional MDE or non-MDE items reported with this notification, The estimated total value of MDE increased by $5.532 billion for a revised estimated value of $10.96 billion. The estimated total case value increased by $5.56 billion to a revised total estimated case value of $11.46 billion. MDE constituted $10.96 billion of this total.

This transmittal notifies the inclusion of the following MDE items: six hundred (600) PAC-3 MSE; one hundred fifty (150) Patriot MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T) with canisters; and twenty-five (25) M903 launching stations. The following non-MDE items will also be included: tools and test equipment; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; spare and repair parts; facility design; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total value of the new items is $6.25 billion. The estimated MDE value will increase by $6 billion to a revised $16.96 billion. The estimated non-MDE value will increase by $0.25 billion to a revised $0.75 billion. The estimated total case value will increase by $6.25 billion to a revised $17.71 billion. MDE constitutes $16.96 billion of this total.

(iv) Significance: This notification accounts for requested additional MDE and non-MDE items not included in the original notification. The inclusion of this MDE represents an increase in capability over what was previously notified. The proposed sale will support the United Arab Emirates' ability to maintain reserve stock of PAC-3 MSE and GEM-T to ensure adequate defense capabilities.

(v) Justification: This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of an important regional partner. The United Arab Emirates continues to be a vital U.S. partner for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

(vi) Sensitivity of Technology: The Sensitivity of Technology Statement contained in the original notification applies to the additional items reported here.

The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026. Transmittal No. 26-CM Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of the United Arab Emirates.

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment * $98.8 million.

Other $48.8 million.

Total $147.6 million.

Funding Source: National Funds.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE): One thousand five hundred (1,500) Guidance Sections, Single Variant (Air-to-Air), Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II.

Non-WDE:

The following non-MDE items will also be included: LAU-131 A/A launchers; Mk-152 high explosive warheads; MK66 rocket motors; proximity fuzes; WTU-1/B practice warheads; inert MK66 rocket motors; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, training, and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (AE-P-ABV).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None known at this time.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: May 1, 2026.

* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act. POLICY JUSTIFICATION United Arab Emirates--Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System-II

The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested to buy one thousand five hundred (1,500) guidance sections. single variant (air-to-air), Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II. The following non-major defense equipment items will also be included: LAU-131 A/A launchers; Mk-152 high explosive warheads; MK66 rocket motors; proximity fuzes; WTU- 1/B practice warheads; inert MK66 rocket motors; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; transportation; US Government and contractor engineering, technical, training, and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $147.6 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major defense partner. The United Arab Emirates is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The proposed sale will improve the United Arab Emirates' capability to meet current and future threats by developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-defense capability and improving interoperability with U.S. forces. The United Arab Emirates will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, Inc., located in Nashua, NH. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the United Arab Emirates.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. Transmittal No. 26-CM Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act Annex Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:

1. The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II (APKWS-II) is a design conversion of an unguided Hydra 2.75-inch rocket with a laser guidance kit to give it precision-kill capability. As a relatively low-cost weapon, it is intended as an inexpensive means to destroy targets while limiting collateral damage in close combat. The APKWS consists of an APKWS-II guidance section developed by BAE Systems, a legacy 2.75-inch MK66 Mod 4 rocket motor, a legacy M151 or Mk-152 high explosive warhead, and a Mk435/436-point detonating fuze or M728 proximity fuze. The guided rockets are steered to the target by following reflected laser beam energy directed onto the target either by the launching aircraft, a second aircraft, or ground-based troops operating a laser designator. The APKWS is a tactical rocket system that can be launched from several platforms, including rotary wing, fixed wing, and ground-based vehicles, offering multi-mission, multi-target capability, and precision-strike lethality.

2. The highest level of classification of defense articles, components, and services included in this potential sale is SECRET.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures that might reduce system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that the United Arab Emirates can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to the Government of the United Arab Emirates.

DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 36(b)(1) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

Pursuant to section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, 1 hereby determine an emergency exists that requires the immediate sale through the following foreign military sales cases, including any further amendments specific to the cost, quantity, or requirements of these cases, in the national security interest of the United States:

For Bahrain:

PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T

For Israel:

APKWS-II

For Kuwait:

PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T

Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS)

For Qatar:

PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T

APKWS-II

For the UAE:

PAC-3 MSE and PAC-2 GEM-T

APKWS-II

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register and, along with the accompanying Memorandum of Justification, shall be transmitted to Congress with the applicable notifications. Marco Rubio, Secretary of State. ____ MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR EMERGENCY ARMS TRANSFERS TO BAHRAIN,

KUWAIT, QATAR, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, AND ISRAEL, UNDER SECTION 36(b)(1) OF THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a broad and joint operation against the Iranian regime to remove the existential threat it poses to the United States, Israel, the Middle East, and the world. This historic operation is a defining point in the region's military operations and the region's cooperation with the United States in a fight against a destabilizing regime.

Despite the combined successes of Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Rising Lion to cripple Iran's ability to project power and terror in 2025, the Iranian regime has not abandoned its plans. In the eight months since the Twelve-Day War, the regime restored damaged nuclear infrastructure. accelerated missile production, and continued to finance, train, and arm its proxies throughout the Middle East, while at the same time combating its internal civil crisis and large-scale protests with excessive and deadly force. The combination of accelerated reconstruction of nuclear infrastructure. its ballistic missile stockpile, and its continued circumvention of sanctions created a new reality in the Iranian arena. These trends led to the decision to launch Operation Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, with the aim of halting the regime's attempts to reconstitute its instruments of power.

Bahrain. Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE all have sustained hundreds of direct and ongoing ballistic missile and drone strikes since the start of Operation Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, and they have suffered civilian or military fatalities. In Bahrain, Iran has conducted hundreds of strikes against Isa Air Base, the Bahrain International Airport, and one of Bahrain's major oil refinery complexes. In Kuwait, Iran has launched attacks against Embassy Kuwait, Camp Buehring, airport fuel tanks, and government buildings, killing at least seven U.S. service members. Qatar has suffered significant impacts to its liquified natural gas facilities due to Iranian strikes, which have resulted in an estimated $20 billion in lost annual revenue on top of strikes against Al Udeid Air Base. In the UAE, Iran has targeted Al Dahfra Air Base, U.S. diplomatic facilities, Emirati airports, ports, and oil infrastructure. Israel has weathered the most waves of Iranian and proxy attacks on military, industrial, and residential infrastructure.

These countries have demonstrated strong collaboration with CENTCOM to not only protect each country's sovereignty and citizens, but also to protect U.S. citizens, servicemen and women, and assets in county. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE have all successfully intercepted many attacks using the U.S.-provided Patriot system. All five countries have experienced countless attacks by one-way attack drones and are utilizing U.S. provided interceptors and munitions to counter these attacks.

These countries are essential defense and security partners, and the United States is committed to ensuring our partners have the means to defend themselves. The Departments of State and War are coordinating with Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE to meet their military requirements and ensure their needs are met to defend their territory and citizens, as well as Americans living, working, and traveling in the region.

Given the scale and scope of the regional conflict, it is in the U.S. national security interest to swiftly provide Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE with the systems they require to defend themselves and to reinforce deterrence against other regional threats. The immediacy of the challenge at hand requires overcoming the statutory 30-day Congressional notifIcation timeline to expedite transfers to Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.

For the reasons cited above, an emergency exists requiring immediate provision of these defense articles to Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE in the national security interest of the United States. These transfers, through foreign military sales, will provide needed defense capabilities to Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE as soon as possible. The Secretary of State, therefore, has certified an emergency exists under sections 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776, thereby waiving the Congressional review requirement of these provisions.

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