Agoa Extension Act

Floor Speech

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Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 6500) to extend duty-free treatment provided with respect to imports from certain countries in Africa under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, to extend customs user fees, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the bill is as follows: H.R. 6500

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ``AGOA Extension Act''. SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES IN AFRICA UNDER AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT; RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.

(a) Extension.--

(1) Trade act of 1974.--Section 506B of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2466b) is amended by striking ``September 30, 2025'' and inserting ``December 31, 2028''.

(2) African growth and opportunity act.--

(A) In general.--Section 112(g) of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3721(g)) is amended by striking ``September 30, 2025'' and inserting ``December 31, 2028''.

(B) Regional apparel article program.--Section 112(b)(3)(A) of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3721(b)(3)(A)) is amended--

(i) in clause (i), by striking ``21 succeeding'' and inserting ``24 succeeding''; and

(ii) in clause (ii)(II), by striking ``September 30, 2025'' and inserting ``December 31, 2028''.

(C) Third-country fabric program.--Section 112(c)(1) of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3721(c)(1)) is amended--

(i) in the paragraph heading, by striking ``september 30, 2025'' and inserting ``december 31, 2028'';

(ii) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``September 30, 2025'' and inserting ``December 31, 2028''; and

(iii) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``September 30, 2025'' and inserting ``December 31, 2028''.

(b) Retroactive Application.--

(1) In general.--Notwithstanding section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1514) or any other provision of law, and subject to paragraph (2), any entry of a covered article to which duty-free treatment or other preferential treatment under section 506A of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2466a) would have applied if the entry had been made on September 30, 2025, that was made--

(A) after September 30, 2025, and

(B) before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall be liquidated or reliquidated as though such entry occurred on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) Requests.--A liquidation or reliquidation may be made under paragraph (1) with respect to an entry only if a request therefor is filed with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act that contains sufficient information to enable such Commissioner--

(A) to locate the entry; or

(B) to reconstruct the entry if it cannot be located.

(3) Payment of amounts owed.--Any amounts owed by the United States pursuant to the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry of a covered article under paragraph (1) shall be paid, without interest of any kind, not later than 90 days after the date of the liquidation or reliquidation (as the case may be).

(4) Definitions.--In this subsection:

(A) Covered article.--The term ``covered article'' means an article from a country that is designated by the President as a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country under section 104 of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 U.S.C. 3703) as of the day before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(B) Entry.--The term ``entry'' includes a withdrawal from warehouse for consumption. SEC. 3. EXTENSION OF CUSTOMS USER FEES.

(a) In General.--Section 13031(j)(3) of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (19 U.S.C. 58c(j)(3)) is amended--

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``September 30, 2031'' and inserting ``December 31, 2031''; and

(2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``September 30, 2031'' and inserting ``December 31, 2031''.

(b) Rate for Merchandise Processing Fees.--Section 503 of the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 3805 note) is amended by striking ``September 30, 2031'' and inserting ``December 31, 2031''.
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Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6500, the AGOA Extension Act, legislation to reauthorize the African Growth and Opportunity Act trade preference program.

Our Nation's economic, strategic, and national security interests are front and center in AGOA. Think about it: This program strengthens our critical supply chains and helps us counter the harmful global influence of nations like China and Russia.

Don't just take my word for it. A witness testifying before the Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee put it bluntly when discussing the potential for a lapse in AGOA when he said: ``There will be a party in Moscow. There will be a party in Beijing if we don't reauthorize it.''

To achieve this, however, we aren't going to lower our standards. This extension maintains the most stringent eligibility criteria of any trade preference program, with annual reviews to defend IP rights, human rights, market access, and the rule of law against corruption. To be eligible, countries must also ensure they are not undermining America's national security or foreign policy interests.

While we still need a longer-term AGOA extension, this reauthorization provides a much-needed level of certainty and stability in the near term so that Congress can continue its work on future reforms to address and strengthen U.S. priorities. After all, U.S. businesses have invested $8 billion annually under AGOA while our African trading partners have begun to open their markets for U.S. agriculture.

Protecting market access for America's farmers and ranchers is incredibly important to the rural communities I represent in Missouri, a point I have made in my travels to the regions going back to 2015 when I attended the AGOA forum in Gabon.

After we take this step, we can build further. Americans would benefit if African nations graduated into formal bilateral trade agreements with the U.S.

Right now, the nation of Mauritius is on track to graduate from AGOA within the next 5 years. When African nations take steps to expand their markets to American products, graduating from AGOA should have clear benefits, not negative consequences.

Africa is home to 30 percent of the world's critical mineral reserves, and China is quickly moving to corner the market on critical minerals and exploit Africa's vast resources. Stronger partnerships with African nations mean we will limit China's ability to make further gains in the region and protect our national security interests.

Madam Speaker, for example, last year the Trump administration announced a strategic partnership agreement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo to develop critical minerals.

I thank the chairman of our Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee, Congressman Adrian Smith, for his tremendous work and leadership in proactively building support for this renewal effort.

I urge my colleagues to support this extension of AGOA, which received strong bipartisan approval in the Ways and Means Committee. I look forward to continuing to work across the aisle to further strengthen this critical program.

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Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Smith).

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Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, we have no additional speakers and are prepared to close.

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Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Madam Speaker, first, I say thank you to Ms. Sewell, and Mr. Neal for their help in order to get this across the finish line. This is an important piece of legislation that I know my staff, Josh Snead and Hilary Pinegar, have worked tirelessly on for a long time to make sure that this program does not die. I thank both the Democrat and Republican staff. I thank Jorge Rueda and Alexandra Whittaker, as well. I appreciate the hard work. This is super important.

Reauthorization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act will advance the economic, strategic, and national security interests of the United States today and pave the way for future reforms to strengthen this critical program.

AGOA has a proven track record of holding our trading partners accountable to the strictest standards, while opening markets to American producers, particularly our farming community.

It is a vital tool to combat the harmful influence of nations like China and protect America's supply chains, including access to critical minerals.

Madam Speaker, I include in the Record an article discussing the strategic importance of critical minerals. [Sept. 3, 2025] Why Is Renewing AGOA Strategic for U.S.-Africa Minerals Diplomacy? (Critical Questions by Gracelin Baskaran)

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), first signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 2000, is a unilateral U.S. trade preference program set to expire in September 2025. Its pending reauthorization has sparked debate over whether--and how--it should be extended and reformed. A failure to extend AGOA could have larger ramifications at a time when the United States is doubling down on its commercial diplomacy--and more specifically, its mineral diplomacy efforts--with Africa.

Q1: What is the strategic role of AGOA nations in reshaping critical mineral supply chains?

A1: There are 33 African countries eligible to participate in AGOA. Many of these countries--such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia--are among the world's most well endowed with critical minerals.

In fact, five of the world's top fifteen destinations for rare earths exploration in the past year were AGOA beneficiaries: South Africa, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Angola. Together, they have roughly 50 high-grade rare earths deposits. Moreover, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania cumulatively hold graphite reserves on par with China's, even though China accounted for 77 percent of global graphite output in 2023. According to internal calculations, AGOA beneficiary countries also hold 70 percent of the world's manganese, 89 percent of the world's platinum group metals, 54 percent of cobalt, 23 percent of graphite, and 10 percent of copper. Much of this resource wealth remains untapped, underscoring the vast potential for deepening U.S.- Africa supply chain partnerships in critical minerals. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has financed--or is preparing to finance--mineral projects in a number of AGOA countries, including Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.

Q2: What is AGOA's impact on critical minerals supply chains?

A2: AGOA offers limited tariff advantages to the mining sector, since most minerals already face relatively low tariffs. Its real value lies in the realm of soft power. In June 2025, China announced that it would expand market access by removing tariffs on all imports from 53 African nations. If the United States were to let AGOA expire and reimpose tariffs on African exports, it would send a damaging signal about the future of U.S. commercial diplomacy on the continent. When African governments see comparable opportunities from both the United States and China in the mining sector, they will be more likely to lean toward Beijing.

Q3: Why is renewing AGOA crucial for building long-term minerals diplomacy?

A3: AGOA is important for building commercial diplomacy. While mining generates significant revenue, it is not a major source of employment. Compared to sectors like manufacturing, agriculture, or services, mining has a much lower labor multiplier. Modern operations are highly mechanized, relying more on advanced technology and machinery than on large workforces. The jobs that are created are typically specialized--geologists, engineers, and metallurgists-- limiting wider employment opportunities. Yet Africa urgently needs large-scale job creation, as its population of 1.4 billion is expected to grow to 2.5 billion by 2050. Mining alone is not positioned to meet this demand.

By contrast, AGOA has supported the expansion of more labor-intensive industries, such as textile manufacturing and agriculture. Namibia illustrates this potential. With more than 7.7 million cattle, sheep, and goats, its livestock sector is substantial. After spending 15 years working to meet stringent safety and logistical standards, Namibia became the first African nation to export beef to the United States in 2019. Exports reached 860 tons in 2020 and are projected to grow to 5,000 tons by 2025. Namibia's Meatco has significantly benefIted from duty-free access to the U.S. market through AGOA. Given the infancy of the beef export relationship with the United States, a disruption to AGOA could risk its sustainability and undermine capital investments within the sector.

Sustaining a positive economic relationship with Namibia is key to advancing minerals diplomacy, particularly given its significant mineral wealth. The country is home to the world's fourth-largest uranium reserves--resources that could support the U.S. nuclear renaissance. Today, Namibia hosts three active uranium mines--Rossing, Husab, and Langer Heinrich--all of which have significant Chinese ownership through entities such as the China National Uranium Corporation, China General Nuclear Power Group, and the China Africa Development Fund. The Lofdal heavy rare earths project, partly owned by Japanese investors, produces around 2,000 tons of rare earth oxides annually and contains some of the world's most valuable heavy rare earth metals. In addition, Namibia is on track to become Africa's third- largest lithium producer by 2026.

Namibia's vast resource base, combined with its reputation as one of Africa's most politically stable and well-governed nations, positions it well to develop a growing industrial processing ecosystem. But allowing AGOA to lapse would deal a serious blow to Namibia's labor-intensive beef industry and could undermine future U.S. minerals diplomacy in this resource-rich nation, further ceding ground to China.

Zambia is another important jurisdiction for minerals diplomacy. In the last few years, the U.S. government opened its first-ever Commercial Service Office at the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka and launched a Tripartite Alliance with Zambia and the DRC to advance raw material extraction, processing, and battery manufacturing. The DFC has also provided support to a U.S. company developing one of Zambia's largest copper projects.

Deepening minerals diplomacy will depend on strengthening the bilateral economic relationship. Interviews with Zambian stakeholders reveal mounting frustration among voters that the mining sector is failing to deliver meaningful benefits to the population. Zambia's heavy reliance on copper as its dominant export, coupled with limited economic diversification, has left the country highly exposed to commodity price swings. Expanding U.S. investment into other industries, such as agriculture, textiles, and manufacturing, could ease pressure on the mining industry while simultaneously strengthening Zambia's broader economy and employment generation efforts. Such diversification would generate shared benefits, improve public perceptions of mining, and lessen the risk of abrupt policy shifts that complicate operations for U.S. firms. The tax benefIts derived from AGOA are an important investment incentive. In 2022, 55.3 percent of Zambia's exports to the United States went through AGOA, making its renewal vital to sustaining U.S.-Zambia commercial diplomacy.

More broadly, the expiration of AGOA would likely prompt many African countries to reassess their economic diplomacy strategies. Without preferential access to the U.S. market, governments may find it more attractive--or even necessary-- to expand commercial and strategic partnerships with China, which has already established itself as the dominant player in Africa's trade, infrastructure, and minerals sectors. In the critical minerals space in particular, Beijing's willingness to provide financing, infrastructure, and guaranteed offtake agreements could accelerate African alignment with Chinese interests, potentially sidelining U.S. efforts to build resilient, diversified supply chains.

Q4: Is AGOA congruent with the Trump administration's Africa approach?

A4: It is. Since 2016, U.S. policy toward Africa under the Trump administration has placed a strong emphasis on commercial diplomacy, with critical minerals at the forefront. A major step came in 2018 with the creation of the DFC, which made its first equity investment in the critical minerals sector the following year. In 2023, a review was undertaken of the effectiveness of the President's Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa (PAC-DBIA), an initiative launched during the Obama administration with the mandate to advise the U.S. president, through the commerce secretary, on strategies to expand the United States' commercial engagement across Africa. The review found that the Trump administration convened more PAC-DBIA meetings than either Obama or Biden.

Since returning to office, Trump's Africa policy has been characterized by senior officials emphasizing business and trade over aid. U.S.-Africa engagement has increasingly focused on critical minerals. One major initiative has been a ``minerals-for-security'' proposal in which President Felix Tshisekedi offered the United States access to the Democratic Republic of the Congo's resources in exchange for security support. Following negotiations in Washington and Doha, the DRC and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington, D.C., on June 27, 2025. Attention is now turning to advancing mineral cooperation and broader regional economic integration. In July 2025, the DFC approved financing for two critical minerals projects in sub-Saharan Africa. According to its announcement, these investments are intended both to spur regional development and to strengthen U.S. critical mineral supply chains vital for energy, defense, and advanced technologies.

The challenge for the Trump administration is balancing AGOA, which is a unilateral trade preference program, with its strong preference for more bilaterally beneficial economic statecraft instruments.

Q5: What could AGOA 2.O look like?

A5: AGOA can become more bilaterally beneficial. Linking a unilateral trade preference program with a mining investment incentive could significantly boost capital flows into Africa's mining sector. Such a framework could unlock greater capital flows into Africa's mining sector, while ensuring that off-take agreements from new projects are secured with the United States and its allies.

A useful precedent for an investment incentive came from the Inflation Reduction Act's Section 30D tax credit, which offered up to $7,500 for the purchase of a new electric vehicle if its batteries met specific sourcing requirements for critical minerals and manufacturing. To qualify for the minerals portion of the credit, a portion of the battery's mineral content had to be extracted or processed in the United States or a country with a U.S. free trade agreement (FTA). This enabled graphite mined in Mozambique to qualify, since it was processed in Louisiana--yielding benefits to Mozambique's economy while strengthening graphite security for the United States.

Although the 30D provision was recently eliminated, future tax incentives of this kind could be powerful tools to attract mineral investment in AGOA-eligible countries, with the extracted resources routed to the United States or allied partners for processing. The incentive should be industry agnostic, so minerals sourced for defense, semiconductors, and energy would be eligible for the incentive. However, in the meantime, ensuring AGOA's renewal without interruption is essential to signal the strength and continuity of the U.S.- Africa economic relationship.

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Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes,'' and I yield back the balance of my time.

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Mr. SMITH of Missouri. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

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