Decoupling From Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act
Floor Speech
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Mr. GIMENEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 8631) to prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from procuring certain foreign-made batteries, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows: H.R. 8631
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act''. SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT OF CERTAIN BATTERIES.
(a) In General.--Beginning on October 1, 2027, none of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Department of Homeland Security may be obligated to procure a battery produced by an entity specified in subsection (b).
(b) Entities Specified.--The entities specified in this subsection are the following:
(1) Contemporary Amperex Technology Company, Limited (also known as ``CATL'').
(2) BYD Company, Limited.
(3) Envision Energy, Limited.
(4) EVE Energy Company, Limited.
(5) Gotion High tech Company, Limited.
(6) Hithium Energy Storage Technology company, Limited.
(7) Any entity on any list required under clauses (i), (ii), (iv), or (v) of section 2(d)(2)(B) of Public Law 117-78 (commonly referred to as the ``Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act'').
(8) Any entity identified by the Secretary of Defense as a Chinese military company pursuant to section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113 note).
(9) Any entity included in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulation.
(10) Any subsidiary or successor to an entity specified in paragraphs (1) through (9).
(c) Treatment of Production.--For purposes of this section, a battery shall be treated as produced by an entity specified in subsection (b) if such entity--
(1) assembles or manufactures the final product that uses such battery; or
(2) creates or otherwise provides a majority of the components used in such battery.
(d) Waivers.--
(1) Relating to assessment.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary assesses in the affirmative all of the following:
(A) The batteries to be procured do not pose a national security, data, or infrastructure risk to the United States.
(B) There is no available alternative to procure batteries that are--
(i) of similar or better cost and quality; and
(ii) produced by an entity not specified in subsection (b).
(2) Relating to research.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the limitation under subsection (a) if the Secretary determines that the batteries to be procured are for the sole purpose of research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis
(3) Congressional notification.--Not later than 15 days after granting a waiver under this subsection, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a notification relating thereto.
(e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the anticipated impacts on mission and costs on the Department of Homeland Security associated with carrying out this section, including with respect to following components of the Department:
(1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection, including the U.S. Border Patrol.
(2) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, including Homeland Security Investigations.
(3) The United States Secret Service.
(4) The Transportation Security Administration.
(5) The United States Coast Guard.
(6) The Federal Protective Service.
(7) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(8) The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers.
(9) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
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Mr. GIMENEZ. 8631, the bill now under consideration.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of my bill, H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act.
Our world is increasingly reliant on battery technology, from the smartphones in our pockets to the energy storage systems that power our homes and businesses.
This dependence underscores a larger issue: Our Nation is becoming increasingly reliant on foreign adversarial entities for the materials and technologies that power these devices, which poses grave risk to our Nation's security and economic stability.
As it stands, Communist China produces approximately 80 percent of the world's batteries and roughly 70 percent of the world's lithium-ion batteries. These staggering numbers leave U.S. supply chains vulnerable and our Nation's security at risk.
Recently, the United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, a committee that I am a member of, uncovered information that revealed that at least two of the world's top battery manufacturers, CATL and Gotion High-Tech, are affiliated with Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation, a paramilitary and CCP-owned entity that is expressly named in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act statute due to its egregious forced labor practices.
Specifically, XPCC has been accused of assisting the CCP's policy in Xinjiang that implemented comprehensive surveillance, detention, and indoctrination that targeted Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic minority groups that the CCP is attempting to eradicate. Furthermore, XPCC utilizes forced labor practices to manufacture their wide range of products.
In addition, dependence on batteries that are manufactured in the PRC presents incredible risks to our national security. There are legitimate concerns that PRC-aligned battery companies and other similar Chinese entities could install malware and other intelligence- gathering sensors on these products, which could result in gathering sensitive information or execute a shutdown on EV charging networks and battery-energy storage systems or even disable targeted vehicles through hardware infiltration.
Last year, reports indicated that the PRC-aligned CATL installed its batteries at facilities in Florida, Virginia, Nevada, and California, as well as a solar farm on leased land inside the U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. Energy-storage batteries produced by the PRC-aligned CATL at Camp Lejeune have been decommissioned, following increased pressure from Congress.
The Pentagon's decision to not only remove the PRC-aligned CATL batteries from Camp Lejeune but also to make it clear it will not buy CATL batteries because of concerns is more than adequate to demonstrate why we should not have these batteries in other parts of our critical infrastructure.
Our government should not be spending tax dollars to procure batteries from companies that profit from slave labor or provide another avenue for the CCP to expand their surveillance apparatus here in the United States homeland.
My legislation, H.R. 8631, the Decoupling from Foreign Adversarial Battery Dependence Act, is a critical first step in addressing this issue. Modeled after previous provisions included in the fiscal year 2024 NDAA, my legislation builds off these efforts and prohibits the Department of Homeland Security from procuring battery technology companies that have deep ties to the CCP and engage in human rights abuses. In doing so, this bill helps our Nation take a step to advance efforts to decouple from the PRC and safeguard critical supply chains from exploitation.
I am proud to see this bill pass out of committee in a bipartisan nature and look forward to seeing it pass the full House with a bipartisan vote.
Mr. Speaker, we cannot continue to surrender dominance over our critical supply chains to our geopolitical rivals. Communist China will exploit any economic or security vulnerabilities that could be created from the Department of Homeland Security's reliance on lithium-ion batteries.
To put an end to this dependence and to take important steps in decoupling from the CCP, I urge a ``yes'' vote on H.R. 8631.
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