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Floor Speech

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Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. President, last week, I came to the floor and brought forward the proof that the Biden administration allowed an Iranian influence operation to infiltrate our government, and they compromised one of the most sensitive weapons negotiations in our Nation's history. It was only after the media and Senate Republicans exposed this ongoing threat to our national security that the Biden administration agreed to investigate it.

So, as I said, last week, I sent a letter to the Pentagon, demanding to know why Biden administration officials granted these operatives top-secret security clearances and sent them to negotiate with the very adversaries that they once worked for.

But, today, I want to remind my colleagues of another influence operation that we have known of for a long time which requires no security clearance and no special access to government documents.

For years, TikTok has been under scrutiny for its ties to the Chinese Communist Party. We know that this company openly violates basic privacy standards, puts user data in the hands of the CCP, and subjects U.S. users to Chinese influence operations. Almost 100 million Americans have this app on their phones.

And the Biden administration? They have very little to say about this. In fact, the President himself has embraced it as a tool to rehabilitate his failed policies with young voters. He has invited TikTok influencers to the White House.

Still, my colleagues and I have made it impossible for the Biden administration to totally ignore the threat. TikTok has been in negotiations with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. It is known as CFIUS. They are in negotiations on a potential framework called Project Texas that will supposedly keep Americans' data secure and make it impossible for Beijing to manipulate the flow of information in the app.

A core component of these discussions involves measures to separate TikTok from its Chinese parent company, ByteDance. But, of course, we are already seeing the CCP find creative ways to get around that firewall.

As you know, they have a habit of doing this with their propaganda schemes, whether it is Confucius classrooms, Confucius Institutes, Sister Cities programs, or a social media app, TikTok.

The Wall Street Journal reported last week that this year, TikTok has transferred many high-level executives from ByteDance to TikTok in the United States. These executives are leading major divisions at TikTok, which provides the CCP with a significant degree of influence over the way they do business.

The personnel changes undermine TikTok's independence from ByteDance, and there is no chance that this happened by accident.

It is clear what TikTok is doing. They are repurposing ByteDance employees to masquerade as TikTok employees, undercutting the guardrails against Chinese espionage.

We know that with the Confucius Institute, many of these professors who came our way were indeed connected and sent there by the Chinese Communist Party.

Over the past 3 years, it has become clear that we cannot rely on the Biden administration to follow through on its promises to protect and defend this country and the citizens of this country. They fall behind repeatedly, especially when it is politically inconvenient to do so.

So, today, Senator Blumenthal and I sent a letter to the CEO of TikTok demanding to know how many of his employees are former ByteDance employees? What are their jobs? What are the security protocols and other rules that are going to be imposed on these transfers? These are questions that we need the answers to.

We also want to know if these personnel changes were disclosed to CFIUS before the Wall Street Journal published its article.

Senate, Washington, DC, October 3, 2023. Mr. Shou Zi Chew, Chief Executive Officer, TikTok, Culver City, CA.

Dear Mr. Chew: We write regarding reports that TikTok has recently hired several high-level executives from its Chinese parent company ByteDance, further calling into question the independence of TikTok's operations and the security of its U.S. users' information.

The Wall Street Journal recently reported that ``[slince the start of the year, a string of high-level executives have transferred from ByteDance to TikTok,'' moving from China to the U.S., including after the departure of U.S. executives. The former ByteDance executives have reportedly assumed influential roles overseeing TikTok's ``advertising business, human resources, monetization, business marketing and products related to advertising and e-commerce initiatives'' and have brought their own staff from Beijing.'' These changes were alarming enough that employees raised concerns about the lack of a true separation from ByteDance-- reportedly joking that TikTok is solving its ByteDance problem by moving ByteDance to the U.S.

The relationship between ByteDance and TikTok poses a unique risk to the security and privacy of TikTok's users in the United States. TikTok executives, including personnel based in China, have been found spying on American journalists, and, in leaked recordings, its staff acknowledged that ``everything is seen in China.'' As the intelligence community has repeatedly warned, Chinese national security laws provide the Chinese government significant legal control over any data within the reach of Chinese companies, thereby putting any data held by ByteDance in the reach of the Chinese government.

In response to these widespread concerns, TikTok has repeatedly made commitments and representations to the American public about the independent management of TikTok's operations, the limited role of ByteDance, and the security of U.S. users' information. You have attempted to distance TikTok from ByteDance and promised a separation that ''amounts to a firewall that seals off protected US user data from unauthorized foreign access,'' with ``American data stored on American soil by an American company, overseen by American personnel.''

However, the recent move of many ByteDance executives to the U.S. seemingly undermines this assertion to Congress and the public. The personnel changes give the impression that TikTok is attempting to preserve ByteDance's influence over TikTok while avoiding suspicion. Once again, TikTok's actions appear to align with a pattern of misleading actions and broken commitments regarding serious matters related to users' safety and national security, which we noted in a previous letter to you.

We are concerned these personnel changes undermine the security of U.S. data and the representations TikTok has made about its independence from ByteDance. As such, please fully answer the following questions by October 13:

1. Prior to December 31, 2022, how many employees were hired by TikTok who had previously worked at ByteDance?

2. Since January 1, 2023, how many employees have been hired by TikTok who previously worked at ByteDance?

3. Please identify the roles of all current TikTok employees who previously worked at ByteDance?

4. Were these personnel changes disclosed to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States prior to the report in the Wall Street Journal?

5. What security protocols are you imposing on ByteDance employees that transfer from China to the U.S.?

6. Are there any rules, restrictions, or controls on communications between TikTok employees who were previously employed at ByteDance and personnel based in China?

7. How does TikTok supervise or oversee communications between its employees who were previously employed at ByteDance and personnel based in China? Sincerely, Marsha Blackburn,

U.S. Senator. Richard Blumenthal,

U.S. Senator.

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Mrs. BLACKBURN. Mr. President, we know that popular opinion would have each and every one of us believe that the threat posed by TikTok just isn't that serious. And we know from experience that the White House dislikes challenging popular opinion. After all, we hear: This is just an app the kids like to use. This is just a silly app with videos. This is an app that is putting up challenges. There is nothing wrong here.

But what we do know is that TikTok gathers all of this information. They have insight into the virtual ``you.'' Once they are on your phone, they are following where you go, what you do, gathering keystrokes, and building that profile. We know this information leaves the United States, and we know this information makes its way to Beijing.

Why do they think they need this information on U.S. citizens? Why do they think they need to follow U.S. citizens? All of this is a reason that CFIUS is reviewing TikTok.

This country can no longer afford to take the word of our adversaries at face value. Self-propaganda--that is what the Chinese Communist Party is all about. They see that as a way to infiltrate our society, to infiltrate public opinion, to infiltrate and to influence elections.

This is not the first letter Senator Blumenthal and I have sent to TikTok demanding transparency, and I would imagine this is not going to be the last.

I know it is very difficult to accept that a silly video app that is liked by 100 million Americans could possibly pose a threat to our national security, but we believe that it does.

I would remind my colleagues--indeed, anyone who has not deleted this spy app from their phones--to, please, recognize the threat that is there and do not provide your information to one of our greatest adversaries.

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