National Defense Authorization Act

Mr. REED. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the Defense authorization bill that we are debating today and for the remainder of this week.

I first want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for their courtesy, for their thoughtfulness, and for their collegiality in the conduct of the committee in the preparation of this bill. They are two Senators I respect and admire greatly. I thank them for their help and participation.

This is, overall, a very good bill that meets the needs of our fighting men and women. I have some reservations which I will talk about tonight, and during the course of the week I will suggest some improvements in the bill. But overall, this represents a thorough and consistent and appropriate discharge of our responsibility to ensure that the men and women of our Armed Forces are the best prepared and best cared for in the world.

Let me also say this year I had the privilege and the opportunity to serve as the ranking member of the Emerging Threat and Capability Subcommittee. I had the pleasure of working with Senator PAT ROBERTS of Kansas. I also want to thank Senator Roberts for his courtesy and thoughtfulness and for his collegiality. He created a cooperative spirit on the committee which resulted in legislation that is both thoughtful and which I think is a vast improvement for the men and women of our military services.

The package supported and presented by the subcommittee dealt with a range of subjects. The subcommittee itself was created 4 years ago to deal with new emerging threats and our response to these threats. The subcommittee looked at issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and information warfare, and it also focused on ways in which we can respond to these threats.

One of the areas, for example, is the Defense Science and Technology Program—providing the research and the analysis that makes our forces the most technologically advanced in the world.

Another area we are concerned about is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. There is a rather simple and obvious point: If we can reduce the threats, that is a better way than to respond to those threats if they are poised against us.

We are also concerned about our special operations forces. I think we have all seen in the past few months how effective and how important these forces are. They really are the tip of the spear when it comes to our efforts on the war on terrorism.

Needless to say, the Emerging Threats Subcommittee is obviously involved in many issues that are of critical importance today.

Let me speak just briefly about some of the issues as we approach the committee markup.

Science and technology is a critical component of our warfighting capability. This was brought home to me graphically in August of 2001. About 20-plus years ago, I commanded an infantry company—a parachute company—of the 82nd Airborne Division. And in August of 2001, I went back to Fort Bragg to watch a live fire demonstration by a division of the 82nd Airborne Division. I was, of course, very pleased with the toughness and skills of the paratroopers. But I was also impressed with the technology. Each soldier had a night vision device, and each soldier had a laser-aiming device on their weapon. Twenty-five years ago, there was one star-light scope for the whole platoon. It was a big, bulky device which we carried around and used sparingly. There was no laser-aiming device on their weapons.

These are graphic examples of the impact of science and technology on our ability to fight. They have made our soldiers, marines, and airmen the most formidable in the world because when we couple this technology with their skills and spirit and their courage, they are unstoppable.

I am pleased this bill includes provisions that strengthen the coordination between the Science and Technology Program. We really want to ensure that we get the maximum value from our technological investment.

I am also very pleased the bill includes Senator Lieberman's legislation which will increase research on technologies to help improve communications and networking and to help address our bandwidth crisis in the field.

Again, 25 years ago when I commanded troops, bandwidth was a concept which no one talked about. Today, it is an item that is critical to the success of any military force.

When members of the committee go out—as I know my colleagues do—and visit troops and talk to commanding officers, one of their consistent complaints is, We just do not have enough bandwidth. We don't have enough space on the spectrum to push out all the digital information we have to all of our warfighters instantaneously.

So I think Senator Lieberman's proposal will give us an added impetus to examine these issues of bandwidth and conductivity. It is literally the electronic backbone of our military forces. There are some issues of concern which I have with respect to science and technology. All of our experts looking at the appropriate level of funding for science and technology suggest that we should be investing about 3 percent of the defense budget in those programs. Secretary Rumsfeld has said the Quadrennial Defense Review made that point, and the Defense Science Board has endorsed this laudable goal of 3 percent expenditure on science and technology. However, last year the final defense budget did not reach 3 percent, and this year the President's request was $1 billion below last year's vital defense budget.

While I am pleased to note that this bill adds nearly $500 million to the Defense Science and Technology Program and supports significant investments in university research, advanced research to support special operations, and advanced undersea warfare technologies, the funding levels fall short of this 3 percent.

I think we have to maintain robust investment in our science and technology. We tried to close the gap, but there is still a gap. I hope in the next reauthorization—indeed in the conference—we can try to close this gap.

In the area of nonproliferation programs, we all understand that weapons of mass destruction is one of the key threats, particularly if they get into the hands of terrorists. One of the most cost-effective ways to deal with this issue of nonproliferation is to support the Threat Reduction Program. I am pleased to report again that this bill authorizes full funding of these threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, including the Nunn-Lugar program.

This full funding is critical if we are going to eliminate the proliferation threat and if we are going to lower the danger that these materials pose to us, particularly if they get into the hands of terrorists.

Also, the bill includes authority to use Cooperative Threat Reduction Program funds outside the former Soviet Union under appropriate circumstances, as requested by the President.

Again, I think we have to recognize there are many places in the world, regrettably, where material could fall into the wrong hands. This gives the President authority for a much wider geographic approach on proliferation.

One of the problems we particularly worry about is the presence of a vast stockpile of lethal, chemical weapons—some of them small enough to fit into a briefcase—in Russia. This is the residue of years and years of Soviet research.

Under the Nunn-Lugar program, we have a project to destroy all those weapons so they cannot be used and do not fall into the hands of terrorists. There is a set of conditions that requires a Presidential certification before the money can be spent, but this bill provides the President a 1-year waiver of the certification so funds can be used to destroy these chemical weapons. Again, I thank Chairman ROBERTS, particularly, for his consideration of this request and for his willingness to provide this 1-year waiver.

As I said before, our special operations community each day demonstrates their incredible value in our war against terrorism. In recognition of the expanded role of the special operations forces, the Secretary of Defense has declared that rather than simply being a supporting command, special operations would be a command in itself.

Let me try to parse that. Before special operations command supported the CINCs, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM. Today, they not only support these CINCs, but they are their own command in and of themselves with new responsibilities.

I applaud this decision, but I believe Congress should have a better appreciation of the new role that special operations command is taking on. Therefore, the committee included, at my suggestion, a recommendation so the Secretary of Defense can report to us information regarding this new role.

The information would include items such as the military strategy for utilizing special operations troops to fight the global war on terrorism and how the proposal contributes to the overall national security strategy with regard to the war on terrorism; the scope of the authorities granted to the commander of the special operations command by the Secretary of Defense; the operational and legal parameters within which special operations forces will exercise these authorities; the impact on existing special operations missions; the decisionmaking mechanisms, to include consultation with Congress, that will be involved in authorizing, planning, and conducting these operations; and future organizational and resource requirements for conducting the global counterterrorism mission.

I believe the answers to these questions will help us frame our oversight responsibility, and I also think it will help provide the details for the special operations commander and the Department of Defense in relation to their responsibilities and their missions in this new responsibility they have been given.

These are just some of the highlights with respect to the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. I want my colleagues to know of these threats. There are other issues I would like to comment upon in addition to those related to my responsibilities on the subcommittee.

There was, in the committee, a proposal to, in my view, change the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act. I thank my colleagues because, through collaboration with Senators ENSIGN, ALLEN, and others, we were able to do what I think the committee wanted to do: to provide the opportunity to temporarily suspend these regulations if property is needed by a State for emergency purposes but not to undermine completely and irrevocably the responsibility we have to provide suitable excess Government facilities for homeless purposes. I am very pleased and proud the committee was so responsive and so cooperative in that regard.

I also included in the bill an amendment which again was adopted unanimously—I thank my colleagues—that would direct the Secretary of Defense to provide guidelines to the Defense Policy Board. This is an advisory committee consisting of distinguished Americans who provide advice and insight, without compensation, to the Secretary of Defense. It is a very important board but recently it has come under some criticism.

I think in order to dispel that criticism but also to convince and assure the public that access to information and access to key decisionmakers is not being used for profit-making purposes but solely is an exercise in the patriotism of the individual members of the board, I ask that the Secretary of Defense provide guidelines. I hope these guidelines are forthcoming. I think they will be useful. I am pleased they are now included within the bill.

Let me turn to several other topics quickly because I see my colleagues are also in the Chamber to speak.

Within the context of missile defense is an area of the bill that I have some grave reservations. We have decided to pursue missile defense. The President has made the decision, and it is his prerogative to do so, to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The question before us today is, will we do this in a logical, thorough, systematic way? Will we do it in a way in which we can assure the American public we are proceeding with all deliberate speed but also in a way that we can justify a product that eventually will be useful to national defense? These are the basic issues that come before us today.

The President has announced, however, that he intends to field a national missile defense system by September 2004, despite the fact the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation concluded, in his fiscal year 2002 annual report, that the system "has yet to demonstrate significant operational capability." So the plan, in effect, is to field the system before we even know if it will work.

I think that raises grave questions about the usefulness of such a system and grave questions about the level of funding that is going to support a system if we are not ready to declare it operationally useful yet we are ready to declare it will be deployed.

We also understand after 9/11 there are other ways to attack the homeland of the United States and that it is not just through the use of long-range missiles. We have to, in our debate and our discussions and our decisions, be very careful with resources that could be spent in other ways to protect our country and our homeland, particularly.

One of the other aspects of the system that is proposed for deployment is that the decision has been made to field this system without a radar capable of distinguishing between a warhead and a decoy. The radar is a key aspect of any missile defense system.

Indeed, the Clinton administration was criticized very harshly for their national Missile Defense Program, yet this administration has decided to deploy a system that appears, at least on the surface, to be far less capable than the one proposed by President Clinton, particularly when it comes to the radar architecture.

Another issue, with respect to missile defense, is the decision to significantly reduce the number of tests. Ironically, it seems that one of the byproducts of the President's decision to rapidly field a national missile defense is a concomitant reduction in the amount of testing. It seems to me that is sort of doing things exactly the wrong way; that if you are going to accelerate deployment, you would accelerate testing also.

I believe if we are going to have confidence in a system that we field, we have to make the investment in testing now, and not just simply reply upon our faith in technology that has not yet been adequately tested.

Originally, 20 national missile defense tests had been scheduled to occur between mid-2002 and 2007, but after the President's deployment decision, 9 of these 20 tests were canceled without explanation. Furthermore, the scheduled date to complete this new, very minimal test plan is now 2009 instead of 2007. That is 5 years after the advertised deployment of this system in 2004.

We have to recognize this Missile Defense Program is the largest single acquisition program in the Department of Defense, with a budget request of more than $9 billion in fiscal year 2004 alone.

For perspective, this funding could buy 9 DDG-51-class destroyers, 45 F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft, or more than 2,800 Stryker armored vehicles. So the decisions we make are not without cost, not without opportunity costs.

The investment we make in missiles means, quite literally, we cannot buy new destroyers; today we cannot buy more F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft; we cannot buy more Stryker armored vehicles. So again, I think we have to look very carefully at the deployment, at the testing.

I think we are all committed to the notion of someday putting in place a missile defense system that will effectively defend the United States, but we cannot do it hastily, and we cannot do it simply on a wish that it works. I believe we have to prove it works before we deploy it or simply declare it is deployed.

Over the last several years, we have tried to put some structure, if you will, in the Missile Defense Program. For example, at the beginning of fiscal year 2002, Congress required that the Bush administration establish cost, schedule, testing, and performance goals for missile defense, and we directed the General Accounting Office to review whether progress was being made toward these established goals.

By the end of 2002, the Bush administration had still not established any meaningful goals for missile defense. Consequently, in November 2002, the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the GAO wrote to the committee to say that since no goals had been established, GAO could not complete its review.

I think, at a minimum, there should be costs, there should be schedules, there should be goals, certainly at a level so the GAO can at least offer a preliminary assessment of whether these goals are being achieved or what effort must be expended to achieve these goals. That is something that has not been done.

I support prudent research and development and testing on national missile defense, but I think ultimately we all want to assure the American people that when we put something in the field, it will work, and that we know precisely what it will do when it is in the field. I don't think that is too much to ask the administration.

Finally, let me cover a topic that will receive a great deal of attention over the next couple days. That is the issue of nuclear policy. I have grave concerns over some of the provisions in the bill. Under the guise of maintaining flexibility and keeping all options open, this bill approves and encourages the administration to continue its push to develop, test, deploy, and possibly use nuclear weapons. I heard my colleague Senator Levin earlier today referencing the quote by former Ambassador Brooks, the head of NSSA, who said his bias is to something that can be used. For many decades, our bias was against even thinking about the use of nuclear weapons if we could avoid it.

One of the consequences of the proposal for a low-yield nuclear weapon, for a robust nuclear earth penetrator is, if not a fact, an observation that as you make weapons such that their collateral damage is minimal, there is a tendency to use them. We have to ask ourselves in our recent conflict in Baghdad, would we have dropped dumb bombs in the middle of crowded neighborhoods in an attempt to attack the leadership of Iraq? It would have been a much harder call. But because we had precision weapons with low collateral damage, as a result the call was much easier—a tough call, nevertheless, but easier.

I fear that as we move down this path for low-yield nuclear weapons, more usable nuclear weapons, the threshold, the inhibition against use will come down also. This is just not another tool in our tool kit. Nuclear weapons have been, since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a weapon every nation has tried to avoid using in combat. I hope we can continue that effort, but I fear the language, the momentum, the incentives that have created these exceptions in the bill are driving us down the wrong path.

We should respond by amending the legislation to reflect the continuing desire to put nuclear weapons outside of use, to delegitimize their use in conflict. We will have opportunity over the next several days to debate in much more detail the issue of nuclear weapons, the issue of missile defense.

I believe this legislation overall is sound. If we could make successful amendments to some of the provisions with respect to missile defense and particularly the provisions with respect to nuclear weapons, we can send to conference a bill of which we will all be very proud. I hope in the next few days we can do that.

I thank the chairman and ranking member for their thoughtful approach and for their continued efforts over the next few days.

I yield the floor.