Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program Authorization Act of 2018
Floor Speech
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Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 6439, the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program Authorization Act of 2018.
I have long supported Department of Homeland Security overseas programs aimed at preventing terrorist threats from ever arriving at our borders. In fact, over the years, I have sponsored a number of measures that specifically seek to drive greater international collaboration and expand DHS' overseas border security footprint.
Two well-established overseas DHS programs that come to mind are:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Preclearance program, in which officers are posted abroad to screen travelers prior to boarding U.S.- bound flights; and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Visa Security Program, in which ICE special agents are posted at overseas consulates to assist State Department staff in visa vetting.
Earlier this Congress, Representative Filemon Vela, the lead Democrat on our Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee, introduced two bills aimed at bolstering international border and counterterrorism cooperation:
H.R. 2218 would authorize ICE's Border Enforcement Security Task Force, a program that has been proven to be effective at enhancing cooperation and information sharing among law enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border.
The second bill, H.R. 4578, is targeted at expanding efforts carried out by CBP's National Targeting Center aimed at disrupting and dismantling terrorists and other criminal networks.
When presented to the full House, both bills received unanimous support from Democrats for good reason: They are effective counterterrorism programs.
However, I am sorry to say, as of today, there is not enough data to assess whether the same can be said for ICE's Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program, or BITMAP, pilot. As such, I cannot support permanently authorizing it, as set forth under H.R. 6439.
I would expect that some Members of this body are unfamiliar with the program, as it is largely a classified program and, as such, little information about BITMAP is in the public domain.
Since 2011, ICE's BITMAP pilot program has trained and equipped foreign law enforcement partners on collecting biographic and biometric data of foreign nationals migrating through partner countries so that such information can be checked against U.S. intelligence and law enforcement databases.
The stated goal of the program is to identify known or suspected terrorists or criminals prior to arrival at our borders. Though in operation for several years, the volume of data collected only started to be significant in the last 2 years.
Prior to considering H.R. 6439 in committee, committee members had repeatedly been presented in a classified setting with anecdotes about successes that the program has experienced. While we appreciated hearing positive news about this pilot, anecdotes are not enough to justify permanently authorizing this program. Anecdotes are no substitute for data and evidence of efficiency.
In an effort to secure data prior to committee consideration, I submitted a number of basic questions about the program's efficacy and operations to ICE.
I received a response prior to the committee's markup that raised further questions about BITMAP's efficacy as well as core operational questions, such as:
After checks against databases, what does the U.S. Government do with the records it collects on migrants who are not found to have terrorist ties?
What, if any, protections exist to guard against the collection of highly personal and sensitive information from migrants with no criminal or terrorist ties who are encountered nowhere near the U.S.- Mexico border and have no intentions of coming anywhere close to it?
What, if any, audit or oversight mechanisms exist to ensure that foreign partners adhere to requirements of the program and do not use this sophisticated law enforcement tool to suppress domestic activities?
Over the recess, ICE officials briefed the committee staff about BITMAP, but fundamental questions remain.
I hope that there will be a day when I can say without reservation that, after careful review of BITMAP's operational documents and data, I fully support making it permanent. Unfortunately, today is not the day.
In the absence of evidence, I cannot support H.R. 6439, but I am supportive of the pilot continuing so that ICE can work to aggregate and assess critical data to make an evidentiary case to Congress for why the program should be permanently authorized.
I would note that enactment of H.R. 6439 is not necessary for BITMAP to continue to operate. With or without passage of H.R. 6439, ICE expects to continue to be able to operate the pilot.
Madam Speaker, before I close, I include in the Record a letter from the American Civil Liberties Union in opposition to this legislation. September 4, 2018. Re Vote NO on H.R. 6439, the Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) Authorization Act of 2018.
Dear Representative: On behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, National Immigration Law Center and the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, we urge you to oppose H.R. 6439, legislation that would permanently authorize the biometric pilot program known as ``BITMAP'' within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The House is expected to consider this bill under suspension of the rules on Tuesday, September 4, 2018. We urge you to oppose H.R. 6439.
H.R. 6439 would permanently authorize BITMAP, a program which has existed since 2010--but with no privacy or transparency protections, and with insufficient fact-finding during committee consideration of the bill. Although BITMAP would continue without enactment of this legislation, the House should not permanently authorize the BITMAP program with limited information, no information on whether DHS takes any steps to protect privacy, no studies regarding its efficacy, and no statutory privacy or transparency protections.
This bill raises significant concerns regarding the sharing of information across foreign governments related to suspicion of terrorism, gang violence, and other so-called national security concerns with very little information as to how this information is used and retained. In 2010, DHS began piloting BITMAP to collect and share biometric and biographical data on ``special interest aliens, violent criminals, fugitives and confirmed or suspected terrorists.'' According to previous testimony by DHS officials, this also includes gang members and other persons of interest who may pose a potential national security concern.
There is no information or proof as to BITMAP's effectiveness. Despite numerous requests from Congress, including members of the House Homeland Security Committee, DHS has failed to provide information since the program's inception in 2010 that shows its effectiveness or that it is tailored to meet its needs. Given this, it is premature to permanently authorize the program, particularly given the significant privacy and civil liberties concerns.
The legislation fails to require that the program adhere to privacy protections. This program includes the sharing of extraordinarily sensitive information regarding individuals without warrant or analogous legal process. Yet, the legislation fails to include any privacy standards that DHS must follow with regards to the program. For example, what information can be collected, how long can it be stored, when can it be disseminated to other agencies, and can it be shared with foreign partners? The omission of these protections in the bill is particularly striking given that the agency has not provided any public information regarding what, if any, privacy protections currently apply to the execution of BITMAP.
The legislation fails to place limits on how information collected under BITMAP can be used. There is little to no information regarding what actions may be triggered as a result of these database checks nor information regarding what is considered ``suspicion'' or a ``national security concern.'' The terms used by officials in discussing this program such as terrorism, gang members, and national security concern have historically been used to target Muslim, Arab, Iranian, Latinx, Middle Eastern, and South Asian populations. The failure to provide information regarding policies governing BITMAP raises significant concerns that the program may result in unjust profiling and discrimination. The existing legislation fails to include any language that would prohibit such improper uses. Moreover, insufficient information has been made public to assess whether such profiling and discrimination are current problems with the program.
Under this bill, DHS would have the authority to enter into agreements with foreign countries to carry out BITMAP operations without legislative or judicial review. Although this bill would require DHS to notify Congress before the execution of BITMAP agreements, the agreements would not be subject to congressional authorization. This legislation would significantly undermine Congress' oversight role by allowing DHS to take measures without sufficient checks or balances. Additionally, the bill fails to ensure that the public is made aware of how DHS is exercising its authority.
It is irresponsible to permanently authorize BITMAP without a full understanding of its effectiveness, policies and procedures, privacy and civil rights protections, and oversight mechanisms.
We urge you to oppose H.R. 6439. Sincerely, American Civil Liberties Union. Immigrant Legal Resource Center. National Immigration Law Center. National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild.
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Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Speaker, it is our duty as Members of Congress to ensure that counterterrorism pilot programs are effective prior to permanently authorizing them. As I mentioned at the outset, DHS has a number of proven overseas, border, and counterterrorism programs that have strong congressional bipartisan support.
However, with all due respect to the chairman, the efficacy of BITMAP as a counterterrorism program has not been established. As such, a permanent authorization of H.R. 6439 is premature.
Given the classified nature of this program, some Members are unfamiliar with it and there are natural limitations as to what we are able to discuss on the House floor. But I understand that at an unclassified staff-level briefing during the recess on threats in the Caribbean, ICE officials stated that BITMAP is working and successful, but failed to provide data to back up the assertions.
I will concede that ICE has shared some promising anecdotes, and I do not object to ICE officials touting what they see as a successful overseas program to Congress. However, when ICE's broad-based assertions and anecdotes are not backed up with data and metrics, it falls to Congress to carry out oversight of the program, not blindly authorize it.
Let's not reward the administration for failing to provide Congress with necessary data and metrics. Let's come together and vote down H.R. 6439. By taking such action, we will be communicating to ICE our expectations, while in no way preventing the BITMAP pilot from continuing as it has for the past 7 years.
As I said earlier, I sincerely hope that the positive aspects of BITMAP being touted by the other side of the aisle today can be backed up by reliable data and facts. Unfortunately, the little information we have on BITMAP to date simply does not justify a standalone authorization.
Madam Speaker, I ask my colleagues to oppose H.R. 6439, and I yield back the balance of my time.
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