BRAC

BRAC -- (Senate - July 26, 2005)

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, last week I offered an amendment to suspend the 45-day congressional review of the President's final BRAC recommendations pending completion of several vital studies pertaining to long-range security needs in the implementation of BRAC and redeployment of many units presently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan back to bases in the United States.

I also introduced a similar amendment yesterday that would allow Congress discretion to remove individual bases from the closure list based upon the findings of these studies and results of the redeployments.

There are two separate options, one of which I hope comes to the Senate for a vote. I underscore the assertions I made last week. The underlying purpose of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, or BRAC, is not only good for our Armed Forces, it is good for American taxpayers. We all want to eliminate waste and reduce redundancy in the Government, but when Congress modified the BRAC law in December of 2001 to make way for the 2005 round of base closings, it failed to envision this country involved in a protracted war involving stretched manpower resources and the burden of large overseas rotational deployments of troops and equipment. This is not the time to begin a new round of domestic base closures and massive relocations of manpower and equipment.

I am aware, hearing that coming from a Member of Congress with a major base on the chopping block, that assertion may sound like another pitch to defend a home State parochial interest. Regardless of the outcome for my base, I am very concerned about how this BRAC round will affect our Nation's overall military posture, not only in South Dakota but around the country and around the world. This BRAC, in particular, has serious implications both in the short term, because we are engaged in a war, and in the longer term because of the need to preserve critical infrastructure as we enter a very uncertain future.

In essence, we cannot lose sight of the imperative of, in addition to saving money, perhaps the most critical goal of BRAC should be to maximize our Nation's warfighting capability. If we fail to follow that fundamental principle, the BRAC process will fail us and ultimately put this country at risk.

This BRAC, in particular, not only has serious implications, it raises serious questions, especially in terms of its timing. In the short term, our war in Iraq and Afghanistan has put great logistical strain on our Active military and Reserve Forces in terms of both manpower and resources. The rotational deployment of personnel and assets to overseas areas of operation has disrupted normal training and maintenance cycles and left military families with uncertainty.

The drain of resources also raised questions as to our ability to respond to additional flashpoints if a crisis should arise elsewhere in the world. Yes, the military is performing its ongoing missions remarkably well under the circumstances, but is this the time to add to those commitments by initiating a massive reshuffle of personnel, equipment, and missions between bases all over the country?

In the long term, these recommendations may pose an even more serious risk to our security. As the DOD itself points out in the National Defense Strategy, published earlier this year:

Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists, proliferation and problem states that possess or seek WMD, increasing the risk of WMD attack against the United States.

We simply do not know what dangers may emerge from military powers such as North Korea, China, Iran, or various rogue states in the next 20 years or more. The threat of terrorism directed against targets in this country should be indisputable after September 11.

There have been four prior BRAC rounds in the last 20 years. I believe it is readily apparent that the Pentagon's 2005 BRAC recommendations go beyond reducing excess infrastructure and would, instead, reduce critical infrastructure needed to fight the wars of the 21st century.

Prior rounds have been successful in pulling much of the low-hanging fruit and in reducing waste.

This round begins to cut into the muscle. I want to show you a chart from 1958, for example. You see there was a large number of Air Force bases in the northern region of this country. Air Force bases were dotted all across the northern tier of the United States: Up in the Northeast, North Central Plains, areas such as that--1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10--a dozen Air Force bases or more in the northern tier of this country.

Today, take a look at how that has changed. One can plainly see how dramatically that number has been reduced and will be further reduced in the 2005 BRAC round.

You saw the previous chart from 1958. All those bases have been wiped out. There are three left in the northern tier of the country. This BRAC round would eliminate Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota and make Grand Forks Air Force Base essentially a ``warm'' base, hopeful of an emerging mission but for all intents and purposes removes the principal mission that has been housed there for some time and leaves literally only one major Air Force base in the northern tier of this country.

Of course, one of the flaws I see in this BRAC is not only the stripping of our air and naval bases in the northern tier, but I seriously question what I believe to be one of the Pentagon's most apparent errors in judgment; and that is to consolidate high-value assets in fewer locations.

In light of the potential threats we face, I wonder whether we really want to discard a tenet of military doctrine that we have lived by for the past 60 years. It is called ``strategic redundancy.'' Put simply, it is the doctrine of dispersing high-value assets at different locations in order to prevent their complete destruction in a single attack.

If you look at the statement here, this is from the Air Force doctrine document, dated November 9, of 2004. It says:

..... it is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy's aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air.

If you look at what the potential threats are we face going forward, and what it means to this Nation to have strategic redundancy, to have those assets dispersed in several locations around the country, and if you look at how that fits in with the Defense Department's own military strategy, you have to ask a question about some of the decisions that have been made in this particular BRAC round.

Let's look at what it says right here. Again, this is the Department of Defense, in its March 2005 National Defense Strategy, when it stated its goal of ``developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in a few locations.''

I want to put up another chart. It has to do with principles and imperatives. Even in the Pentagon's deliberative briefing materials that outline those ``principles and imperatives'' of this BRAC round, it stated that the Department needed secure installations optimally located, that support power projection, sustain the capability to mobilize and ``that ensure strategic redundancy.''

Now, unfortunately, Secretary Rumsfeld's recent BRAC recommendations to consolidate some of the Nation's most valuable U.S. air and naval platforms at single installations would apparently abandon that basic tenet in favor of cutting costs.

Hopefully, we have not forgotten the shortsightedness we once had as a Nation before Pearl Harbor. Now, folks might dismiss such lapses as distant events from another time and another place that are not applicable to today's threats. See on this chart a scene from Pearl Harbor that took place 60-some years ago. Even in the DOD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, released a few weeks ago--and, incidentally, this is a partial completion of one of the amendment's conditions--it notes that ``a significant element of mission assurance is continuity of operations--maintaining the ability to carry out DOD mission essential functions in the event of a national emergency or terrorist attack.''

It also goes on to state that ``an attack on DOD facilities could directly affect the Department's ability to project power overseas.'' One well-positioned crater in a runway could ground the entire fleet of this Nation's B-1 bombers during an emergency, if they are all stationed at one location. It should always come back to the intuitive logic possessed by most Americans, and that is that we simply cannot allow analytical cost models to trump sound and proven security precautions.

Strategic redundancy, obviously, still has a place in our planning, as demonstrated in the Pentagon's own planning documents. Why was it not reflected in its BRAC recommendations?

Additionally, the risk of natural disasters is a constant reminder that we should not put all our assets in a single location. This chart shows a tornado that passed within 1,000 feet of the F-16s and B-1 bombers stationed at McConnell Air Force Base back in 1991. Tornadoes have wreaked havoc on Air Force bases in the past. The one I am going to show you in a moment is Carswell Air Force Base in Texas. We simply cannot afford to risk our Nation's security on the whims of a single deadly tornado that could destroy or damage an entire fleet of aircraft.

Finally, the GAO has also questioned the potential for cost savings estimated by the DOD, calling into question whether we want to risk our national security for questionable cost savings. want to read to you what it says from the GAO study:

There are clear limitations associated with DOD's projection of nearly $50 billion in savings over a 20-year period. Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas.

As this implies, much of these cost savings are apparently illusory. To quote the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator WARNER, during his testimony before the BRAC Commission, he said:

Since 32 percent of BRAC savings come from personnel reductions, this calls into question the entire savings estimate--particularly since we are not reducing any meaningful force structure.

I want to show another GAO chart. The GAO questions, one, the lengthy payback periods; inconsistencies in how DOD estimated costs for BRAC actions involving military construction projects; and uncertainties in estimating the total costs to the Government to implement.

GAO estimates upfront costs of an estimated $24 billion to implement this round of BRAC. To again quote the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee before the BRAC Commission, he said this:

My observations are consistent with the testimony of witnesses and Congressional delegations around the country to date who have presented the Commission firm evidence supporting similar observations of questionable data and an internal collapse of the quantitative analytical foundation in lieu of other guidance provided by senior defense officials. These observations are also consistent with issues raised by the Government Accountability Office in its July I, 2005, report to the Commission and to Congress.

Last week, when I was offering my amendment, the distinguished chairman, Senator WARNER, made what I believe was a reasonable argument, that by suspending the 45-day review period until these conditions are met would cause anxiety among some communities by not knowing their ultimate fate or delaying the process of redeveloping the base to civilian use.

Now, this may be the case for some communities, but I believe most communities desperately want to retain their bases because they are the lifeblood of their local economy. They would do anything--exhaust every possibility--to have these bases remain open. If anything, knowing that this Congress has done all it could to have all the answers before making such a decision I think is tremendously important to these communities.

I also challenge the perception made by many that these communities will have many opportunities to develop these closed bases and quickly restore their economy. This will probably not be the case in rural areas around bases like Ellsworth Air Force Base and Cannon Air Force Base.

Some communities may actually prosper from a base closing, where land for business or home development comes at a high premium and sells for thousands of dollars per square foot. Bases like Oceana, in Virginia, will have no difficulty putting the land to profitable use.

As you can see in this picture, Oceana is surrounded by a sea of development and prosperity. The base is up here. The entire area around it is completely developed. The land is worth lots of money.

But other bases, like Ellsworth, in my State, as you can see in this aerial photograph, are surrounded by miles and miles and miles of empty rangeland and have scant hopes of a booming development taking hold of the former base. There is little doubt that the nearby community of Rapid City would have no problems with the delay if it means ensuring the right decision has truly been made.

There are too many unanswered questions regarding our Nation's long-term security needs and the circumstances in which our military may have to operate in the future to make irreversible decisions for which we could pay a terrible price later. We will not be able to easily replace or position these installations and units once this BRAC is fully implemented and we discover we have made a colossal mistake.

Let's take a breath and slow down. My two amendments, offered as options, merely allow this Nation to have the full benefit of all the information we need before moving ahead to implement BRAC. The risk is too great.

Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

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